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2003] NA TURAL LAW IN THE U.S. PA TENT SYSTEM
TOWARDS DEVELOPING A NATURAL LAW
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
Wendy Limt
There are at least two commonly-held legal misconceptions
when it comes to IP law: patent law is a wholly practical area of law
created entirely by legislation;1 and that jurisprudence and the study
of legal philosophy and justification is an exercise in esotericism,
devoid of any practical significance to those in the practice of law.2 It
is submitted that law and jurisprudence are inextricably connected:
"[i]mplicit in every decision where the question is, so to speak, at
large, is a philosophy of the origin and aim of law, a philosophy
t Wendy Lim, LL.M in Intellectual Property Law, Santa Clara University; LLB (Hons)
National University of Singapore, Faculty of Law. I would like to thank Professor Donald S.
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1. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 10 (1967)
("It may therefore be argued that the granting of a patent... involves what is essentially a
contractual relationship between grantee and government ... Thus what one hand of the
Government would give, another hand would take away."). Id.
2. But see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 23 (1924).
You think that there is nothing practical in a theory that is concerned with
ultimate conceptions. That is true perhaps while you are doing the journeyman's
work of your profession. You may find that in the end, when you pass to higher
problems, that instead of it being true that the study of the ultimate is profitless,
there is little that is profitable in the study of anything else.
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which is however veiled, is in truth the final arbiter."
3
This Article attempts to correct these misconceptions. Perhaps
due to the fact that copyrights are more readily linked to First
Amendment rights of speech, copyright law has generated some
discussion on natural rights and natural law-type theories.4
Comparatively, patent law seems to be a poorer cousin as far as any
discussion on natural rights or natural law jurisprudence is
concerned.5 It is hoped that this Article will go some way towards
remedying this deficiency.
As a prologue, it is appropriate to set out some methodology to
determine which is the most satisfactory justification of the patent
system since this Article seeks to develop a coherent justification of
the patent system.
In the first part, I will argue that a utilitarian justification of the
patent system is not a viable explanation. As a theory, utilitarianism
holds that all actions are justifiable if they promote the common good.
Another interpretation of this theory holds that an action is right or
wrong, depending on the consequences of that action.6 Utilitarians
justify the patent system because it tends to produce and promote
innovations and inventions.7 I will examine the cracks in the logic of
a purely utilitarian justification of patent law, and I argue that, if one
is a deontologist, 8 one cannot at the same time accept utilitarianism as
a justification for the patent system.
3. Id. at25.
4. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 359,
observing that "[p]roponents of cutting back copyright protection usually invoke free speech
and the marketplace of ideas, if not a direct appeal to first amendment, as a "trump" over the
copyright clause." See also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (making the
argument that "a properly conceived natural-rights theory of intellectual property would provide
significant protection for free speech interests" and supports her thesis using copyright cases as
illustrations.").
5. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law.
Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCIETY 697, 699 (1994) ("Patent law
systems and patent systems developed out of a realization that there was indeed a societal need
to recognize and protect a property right in invention.., although for reasons having very little
to do with any perceived "natural law" right.").
6. Utilitarianism "is an approach to morality that treats pleasure or desire-satisfaction as
the sole element in human good and that regards the morality of actions as entirely dependent on
consequences or results for human (or sentient) well-being." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY 890 (Honderich ed. 1995).
7. See infra Part II B 2: Specific Critique of Utilitarianism: Problems with the
Disclosure of Inventions and Encouragement of Inventions Rationales.
8. Deontology is the belief that "certain acts are right or wrong in themselves." THE
OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 6, at 187.
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The second part of this Article describes and critiques the natural
rights theories which have been increasingly advanced as a
justification of intellectual property rights, namely (1) the labor
theory/just desserts theory propounded by the English philosopher,
John Locke,9 and to a lesser degree, (2) the personality theory
articulated by Georg Hegel. 10 I will argue that a theory that focuses
on natural rights without highlighting natural duties is, at best,
incomplete. At the worst, a natural rights theory runs into the same
problem of justification--one key criticism being the argument that
"rights themselves need to be justified somehow, and how other than
by appeal to the human interests their recognition promotes and
protects?"'1 This seems to be the uncontrovertible insight of classical
utilitarians.
In the third part, I will argue that despite its historical origins,
and perhaps, against the wishes of some of America's founding
fathers, U.S. patent law contains fertile grounds for the development
of a natural law jurisprudence. I will propose a third alternative
justification for the patent system: its justification lies in the
foundations of justice, as embodied in classical natural law.
There have been some attempts towards introducing natural law
into the intellectual property law scene, but mainly in the context of
copyright and on the basis of a "no-harm" principle advocated by
John Locke.12  I will explore the classical natural law theories of
property, as enunciated by St. Thomas Aquinas 3 and Hugo Grotius,
and argue that those theories (in particular, Aquinas's theory) are an
advance over pure natural rights or utilitarian theories or even the
abovementioned Lockean natural law theory. I will argue that the
idea of justice under classical natural law is not merely passive but
pro-active because a natural law approach towards patent law would
seek to strike a balance between recognition of the rights of an
individual inventor and its duties towards his community.14
9. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise on Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT ch. V (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
10. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 41-45 (T.M. Knox trans. 1967) (1821)
("[l]ndividual demonstrates ownership of property by imposing its will on it and thereby
occupying it.").
11. T.M. SCANLON, CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 74 ( Scheffler ed. 1998).
12. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
13. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 267-73 (New York, Benziger Bros.,
1947-48).
14. See infra Part VI B.Application of Natural Law Principles to the U.S. Patent System
(discussing this point is in greater detail).
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Finally, I will test my natural law hypothesis against the hard
questions raised in patent law which have not been adequately
answered by any of these schools of thought and submit that a
classical natural justification is the best way forward for the U.S.
patent system.
I. PROLOGUE - THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION: SUGGESTED
METHODOLOGY
This Article essentially tries to answer two questions: first,
"How has the U.S. patent system been traditionally justified?;" and
second, "How ought the U.S. patent system be justified?" In
attempting to find a coherent framework of justification, it may be
useful to set out some ground rules. Since we are dealing with patent
law, an analogous use of the patent claim construction rules may be
instructive. In determining a patent claim, the court can look at
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.' 5 The court should always look first
to the intrinsic evidence of record which is the patent itself.' 6 Words
in the claim are usually given their ordinary and customary meaning,
but the patentee can be his own lexicographer. 7 Next, it is necessary
to review the specification to determine whether there is any use of
terms inconsistent with their ordinary meaning. Third, the courts may
consider the prosecution history.' 8
Under an analogous approach, arguably, the intrinsic evidence is
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which provides the constitutional basis
of the U.S. patent system. On a plain reading, one of the main
objectives of this clause is to "promote the Progress of the useful
arts.' 19  At the same time, the clause also clearly talks about
"securing" to inventors the "right" to their inventions.2 ° An ordinary
interpretation is that this right must have existed prior to the
Constitution; otherwise, why should there be a need to "secure" the
15. Vitronics Corp. v Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("In
determining the proper construction of a claim, the court has numerous sources. These
sources.., include both intrinsic evidence.. . and extrinsic evidence."). Id.
16. Id. ("It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look to
the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself.") Id.
17. Id. ("Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other
than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly stated in the
patent specification or file history.") Id.
18. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1576.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. Id. ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.. . by securing for limited
Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries.").
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rights? Why not "create" such rights?2' It appears, therefore, that
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 envisions the patent system to be one
that balances progress with inventors' rights.
The "prosecution" history surrounding Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 also suggests that a natural law approach is not an
implausible option. The preamble of the Constitution refers, inter
alia, to the idea of establishing "justice,' '22 which is one of the central
concerns of natural law.23 It is true that there may be some
"prosecution history" showing that some of the founding fathers24 did
not subscribe to the natural rights theory, but there is other evidence
25
that counters this fact, as will be shown later.
In summary, from the foregoing, it is submitted that there is a
prima facie case for developing a natural law jurisprudence in the
U.S. patent system. It is further submitted that it is imperative for the
patent system to build its foundations on a coherent, justified
framework so that both practitioners of patent law and policy-makers
will be better equipped to respond to the hard and unforeseen
questions that are being raised in an increasingly complex world.26
21. See DEC. OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776): "We hold these truths to be self evident,
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights. Among these are life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights
Governments are instituted among men." Id. (emphasis added).
See also George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 6, 19
(1935):
I began to see and feel that when an inventor had complied with the law.., he
came there not as a beggar ... but that he came really as a matter of right, and
that my job was to survey the metes and bounds of his invention... The "rights"
herein referred to are inherent rights, not the right of an applicant to become a
burden on the patience of the Examiner or a nuisance to the Patent Office...
Id. (emphasis in original).
22. U.S. CONST. Pmbl.
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
Id. (emphasis added).
23. Richard Wright, Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1860 (2000)
("It has been said that the elaboration of.. substantive equality and its implications for morality,
justice and law from the core of the natural law (or natural right) theory of law..."). Id.
24. E.g., Thomas Jefferson. See infra Part II A.Historical Justification.
25. James Madison and Charles Pickney. See infra Part II C.Summary: Why
Utilitarianism Should Not be a Justification and What about the Constitution?
26. See infraB.Application of Natural Law Principles to the U.S. Patent System An
example of a hard issue that will be explored later will be the issue of cloning.
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II. THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE: UTILITARIANISM-A HISTORICAL
JUSTIFICATION OF THE U.S. PATENT LAW SYSTEM
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts... by




Historically, the U.S. patent system has always been justified on
utilitarian or consequentialist grounds. 28 The oft-cited evidence is the
Intellectual Property Clause29 found in Article. I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the U.S. Constitution - "To promote the Progress of... the useful
Arts.",30  This view is further reinforced by the writings of Thomas
Jefferson, one of the founding founders of the U.S. Constitution:
It has been pretended by some.., that inventors have a natural and
exclusive right to their inventions ... Inventions ... cannot, in
nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive
right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men
to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not
be done according to the will and convenience of society, without
claim or complaint from anybody.
31
The utilitarian/consequentialist justification is premised on two
arguments which will be discussed below. The first is that the patent
system encourages the disclosure of secrets. This argument is
27. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Consequentialism holds that "all actions are right or wrong in virtue of the value of
their consequences." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 154 (Honderich ed. 1995). 1
shall be referring to utilitarianism and consequentialism interchangeably in this Article,
although it should be noted that consequentialism encompasses broader theories which include
nonutilitarian branches which deny that the value of consequences is determined solely, or
possibly at all, by the welfare of individuals. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1264 (Lawrence
C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992). See also Grant v Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 243
(1832) ("The great object and intention of the act is to secure to the public the advantages to be
derived from the discoveries of individuals"). Id.
29. Apparently, the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution was unanimously
accepted with no recorded debate. See BUGBEE, supra note I at 1 (citing 2 JAMES MADISON,
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 509-10 (Max Farrand ed., New Haven
1911-37).
30. Contrary to contemporary notions, "Science" is to be promoted by copyright and
"useful Arts" by patents. See Giles S. Rich, The "'Exclusive Right" Since Aristotle, Address
Before the Foundation for a Creative America: Bicentennial Celebration-United States Patent
and Copyright Laws (May 9, 1990). ("In 1787 "science" did not mean what we take it to mean
today, but knowledge in general.").
31. JEFFERSON WRITINGS 1291-92 (M. Peterson ed. 1984) [hereinafter, JEFFERSON
WRITINGS].
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discussed using social contract terminology.32 The second argument
is that the patent system encourages inventions which lead to the
industrial progress.
1. Disclosure of Secrets
The first argument is formulated as follows:
In the absence of protection against imitation by others, an
inventor will keep his invention secret. This secret will die with
the inventor, and society will lose the new art. Hence, a means
must be devised to induce the inventor to disclose his secret for the
use of his invention for a period and in return he agrees to disclose
his secret in order that it will later be available to society.33 In
"social contract" terminology, there is a contract between the
inventor and society whereby the inventor agrees to disclose the
secrets of his invention in exchange for limited exclusivity.
34
2. Encouragement of Inventions
The second argument can be summarized as follows:
Industrial progress is desirable. Inventions and their exploitations
are necessary to secure industrial progress. Neither invention nor
the exploitation of invention will be obtained to any adequate
extent unless inventors and capitalists hope that successful
ventures will yield profits which make it worthwhile to invest their
time and money. These profits would not likely be possible unless
special measures are taken to prevent others from exploiting the
inventions. The simplest, cheapest, and most effective measure is
an exclusive patent right in inventions.
35
B. Cracks in the Historical Justification
It is undeniable that the public disclosure and other requirements
of the patent system have brought much desirable progress for
society.36 I therefore agree with the utilitarian that the patent system
32. Id;. see also Grant v. Raymond, 6 Peters 218 (1832) ("A patent is a contract made by
the acceptance by the government of the offer which the patentee by his application makes to
disclose his invention in consideration that the United States will secure to him the exclusive use
and sale of it for 17 years.").
33. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM
32 (1953).
34. Grant, 6 Peters 218.
35. PENROSE, supra note 33, at 34-35.
36. See, e.g., Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,
39 REV. ECON. & STATIs. 312 (1957) (tracing the link between technology and growth and
2003]
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is a very useful system. However, the utilitarian claim is something
quite different. There are various versions of utilitarianism, 37 but for
the purposes of this Article, it would suffice to summarize the
utilitarian theory as follows: [u]tility is the standard of morality;38
therefore, the patent system is good because it is useful.
This Article will argue below that the utilitarian justification of
the U.S. patent law system is flawed for the following reasons: i)
most utilitarians simply cannot follow their premises to their logical
conclusion, as such, there is a serious flaw insofar as utilitarianism
purports to be an appropriate philosophical theory; ii) the specific
utilitarian rationales as applied to patent law (namely that form of
disclosure of inventions and encouragement of inventions) are mere
hypotheses, which are not sufficiently supported by empirical
evidence, and provides at best, a shaky foundation for the patent
system.39
1. General Critique of Utilitarianism
A true utilitarian's only moral yardstick is based on the welfare
of the common good.40  However, in reality, most utilitarians who
argue on the basis of the common good and economics are not true
"utilitarians." To illustrate this point, I will borrow two illuminating
found that 87.5% of the growth of American economic output between 1904 and 1949 to
technological factors). Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of
Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface between Competition and Patent Protection in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 375 (citing Charles Jones, Sources of US.
Growth in a World ofIdeas, Stan. Fac. Workshop Paper (September 1999) (arguing that from
1965 to 1990, over 40% of U.S. growth is attributable to the rise in research and development)).
37. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart eds., London: Athlone Press 1970) (1978).
Bentham is one of the leading proponents of utilitarianism and his theory is often espoused in
the hedonistic maxim "greatest happiness for the greatest number." Id. See also JOHN STUART
MILL, UTILITARIANISM (J.M. Robson ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1969) (1861).
Mill's form of utilitarianism tries, but, in the author's opinion, fails to justify utilitarianism by
trying to define happiness as intended pleasure and absence of pain, leading to the conclusion
that the morality of human actions should be judged by the amount of pleasure or pain it evokes.
Mill's theory raises the question, which he fails to answer, of the standard by which to judge
pleasure or pain: is it wealth, power, or leisure the yardstick and is happiness to be lasting or
fleeting?
38. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 890 (Honderich ed. 1995) (defining
utilitarianism as "an approach to morality that treats pleasure or desire-satisfaction as the sole
element in human good and that regards the morality of actions as entirely dependent on
consequences or results for human (or sentient) well-being."). Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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examples used by Professor Leo Katz:
41
Hypothetical 1 - The Case of the Out-of-Control Trolley
42
An out-of-control trolley was heading down an incline when
its driver discovers that the brakes are not working. On the
track ahead are five people who will not be able to get off
the track on time. If he swerves, he will avoid killing the
five people. Unfortunately, in doing so, he will kill one
person who happens to be standing by the side. Is it all right
to minimize lives by turning the trolley?
Hypothetical 2 - The Case of the Heart, The Lungs and the Kidneys
43
A surgeon has five patients, all of whom are doomed to die
unless they receive transplant organs. Two need kidneys,
two need lungs and one needs a heart. There is no donor to
be found except for a perfectly healthy patient who walks
into the surgeon's office for his annual checkup. On seeing
him, the surgeon realizes that the healthy patient is a walking
reservoir of useful spare parts. Can the surgeon quickly and
painlessly kill his healthy patient and use his organs to save
the other five?
Professor Katz suggests that many people will try to justify the
driver turning the trolley in the first hypothetical but not of the
surgeon killing his healthy patient in the second hypothetical. They
may, for example, argue that if organ harvesting is a common
practice, sick people will be afraid to go to doctors and many will die
from lack of treatment, or that doctors may make wrong choices and
harvest organs for patients who are too sick to benefit from them.44
Professor Katz makes a persuasive argument:
If you really believe that the reason the trolley driver can turn his
trolley is because that minimizes the number of lives lost, then you
must, at least, under some circumstances, also approve of what the
utilitarian surgeon does, at least if the utilitarian surgeon engages
in organ harvesting only to prevent many more such instances of
41. LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD AND KINDRED
PUZZLES OF THE LAW 53-55 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1996).
42. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK
94-116 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986).
43. See JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 102 (Hamondsworth:
Penguin 1977).
44. KATZ, supra note 4 1, at 54.
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organ harvesting in the future. If you are prepared to take that
stand, you are a utilitarian at heart.
45
A true utilitarian, who dismisses all other moral standards except
utility, would have to, by his own reasoning, accept that it would be
all right for the surgeon to kill the healthy patient. A prominent
example would be bioethicist Peter Singer, whose appointment to
Princeton University attracted much controversy because some argue
that he advocates infanticide and euthanasia.4 6 Francis Fukuyama
observed that as an "unabashed utilitarian" Peter Singer "is simply
more consistent than most people on the consequences of abandoning
the concept of human dignity.,
47
Some utilitarians, who are better called consequentialists, argue
otherwise. Consequentialism, they argue, demands that the right
thing to do is the act which produces the best overall outcome. They
would argue that from a consequentialist point of view, it is
acceptable not to kill the healthy patient because in the long run, it is
good to maintain the natural aversion. Without this strong aversion,
one may be tempted to inflict harms later that do not produce optimal
results but are merely for personal advantage.48  However,
consequentialists fail to explain why some ends are more optimal than
others. After all, as Nozick observed,
[T]here is no social entity with a good that undergoes some
sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people,
different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using
one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him, and benefits
the others. Nothing more. Talk of an overall social good covers
him up (intentionally)?49
Not many in the U.S. will be prepared to approve of the
utilitarian surgeon killing the healthy patient. If you are not prepared
45. Id. at 55.
46. E.g., the Princeton Students Against Infanticide signed a petition to protest the hiring
of Professor Singer (see http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Agora/2900/psai.html). The President
of Princeton University addressed the controversy surrounding the hiring of Professor Singer on
the Princeton Weekly Bulletin dated Dec. 7, 1998, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/pr/pwb/98/1207/singer.htm.
47. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 154 (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux
2002).
48. The author would like to thank Professor June Carbone of Santa Clara University for
pointing out this possible argument from a consequentialist viewpoint. This does not necessarily
reflect Professor's Carbone's personal views, and all errors remain the author's own.
49. ROBERT NOZICK, FROM ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974), (cited in SCANLON at
140-141, supra note 11).
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to do so because you think that killing the healthy patient would be
wrong, then you are a deontologist at heart; and consequently, you
cannot at the same time, accept utilitarianism as a valid theory. If you
purport to be a deontologist, the logical conclusion is that it would be
equally wrong to knowingly swerve the trolley and kill one bystander
to save five passengers.
2. Specific Critique of Utilitarianism: Problems with the
Disclosure of Inventions and Encouragement of
Inventions Rationales
In Part II A above, I noted that the utilitarian theory in patent law
is premised on two arguments: patents induce disclosure of
inventions; and patents encourage inventions. Here, I will argue that
these arguments have their limitations and at most, describe some of
the possible consequences of the patent law system, but cannot serve
as a justification of it.
a. Disclosure of Inventions Rationale
There are three main theoretical grounds 50 of attack with regard
to this rationale: i) it is difficult to keep important inventions secret
for long; ii) even if the secret is kept, the fact that inventions, by their
nature, usually respond to the needs of society, would mean that
others would soon come up with the same invention; and iii) the
patent system has evolved into a highly expensive and complicated
process such that "inventions are in fact only patented only when
secrecy is impossible.,, 51 A more practical problem with this rationale
is that "there is no way of determining whether or to what extent
patents prevent the loss of new inventions and ideas to society
because inventors would otherwise carry their secrets to the grave."
52
b. Encouragement of Inventions Rationale
This rationale runs against the same limitation as the first- it is
simply not possible to evaluate or accurately test the proposition that
patents encourage inventions. A survey 53 conducted amongst
50. PENROSE, supra note 33, at 33.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 34.
53. PENROSE, supra note 33, at 37-38 (describing various investigations ranging from
hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee (United States, 1939), to the
investigation of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce on the protection of inventions (Switzerland,
1886) and the proceedings of the Select Committee on Letters Patent, House of Commons
2003]
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inventors and businessmen came up with a list of nearly equal length
of those who favor patents and those who think that patents are
neutral or harmful. The only group that was virtually unanimous as to
the desirability of the patent law was, unsurprisingly, the patent
lawyers !
54
Overall, the two rationales, that patents both induce and
encourage inventions, are tenuous, and at best, describe what happens
most of the time. I submit that it is inappropriate to justify the patent
system on such tenuous rationales.
C. Summary: Why Utilitarianism Should Not be a Justification
and What about the Constitution?
Thus far, I have argued that the fact that the patent system has
utilitarian consequences does not necessarily mean that utilitarianism
should be its justification. Just because something is useful does not
make it right. In the patent law context, it is highly possible that a
patent system whose focus is on rewarding the inventors may conflict
with the interests of the common good. By its definition,
utilitarianism would resolve this conflict by arguing that common
good always prevails. Natural law argues this too, but on an entirely
different reasoning that takes into account the natural rights and
natural duties of the inventor in the process of trying to achieve the
common good.
Trying to justify patent law on a natural law approach is a
Herculean task though, which flies in the face of almost everything
that is on record. Most prominently, there is the Intellectual Property
clause in the Constitution and the historical writings evidencing the
motivations of the founding fathers.55 A comparative analysis does
not help: except for France in its early years,56 most other nations also
justify their patent systems on a utilitarian theory.
In response, I would point out that it is almost axiomatic that the
(United Kingdom, 1871)).
54. Id. at 38.
55. JEFFERSON WRITINGS. supra note 31.
56. See Frank D. Praeger, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787, 26 J.
PATY. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 711, 756-757 (1944) (citing the French 1790 Industrial
Property Statute which read: "... it would be a violation of the Rights of Man, in their essence,
not to regard an industrial discovery as property of its author .... Any discovery or new
invention, in any kind of industry, is the property of its author." (emphasis added) ( It should be
noted, though, that France would later retreat from its view of Rights of Man as a justification of
granting property rights in inventions, partly because the 1791 statute "failed to make it clear,
why a right, called a property right, should be limited in time". Id.
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legality or correctness of an act can never be justified by the fact that
everyone else is doing it. History has a proper place in the
interpretation of laws but heretical as it may sound, I pose the
following question: what if the founding fathers, wise as they were
but nonetheless not infallible, were wrong about the justification of
the patent law system? In this regard, we would do well to heed
Judge Rich's advice appearing in the preface to a patent law textbook:
Read on and learn all about it, but be careful. I believe that
progress in legal thinking is not only possible but essential and that
this generation should have a clearer understanding of patent law
than previous generations, notwithstanding stare decisis. So
THINK!
57
Furthermore, that this was the unanimous view of all the
founding fathers far from concludes the matter. Although the
Intellectual Property Clause 58  was adopted unanimously at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, there was no recorded debate;59 so
arguably, the justification of the clause is still open to debate. In the
same way we construe patent claims,6° it can be argued that
Jefferson's view, as expressed in his writings, constitutes only one of
the extrinsic aids in a proper construction of the Clause. On a plain
reading, the clause mentions "securing" exclusive rights to inventors,
which implies the idea that such rights are inherent. 61 As for other
57. CHISUM, NARD, SCHWARTZ, NEWMAN & KIEF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW vi. (2d
ed. 2001).
58. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 cl. 8.
59. BUGBEE, supra note 1, at 128; cf Ramsey, supra note 21 (citing a report in the Annals
of Congress of a debate on the Patent Bill. According to Ramsey, one Mr. William D. Murray, a
Congressman from Maryland, spoke on the pending Patent Bill on January 30, 1793 as follows:
The law ought to facilitate the granting of patents... A country in Europe (Great
Britain), had afforded it was true much experience on the subject; but regulations
adopted there would not exactly comport in all respects either with the situation
of this country or the rights of the citizens here .... There is this strong feature
which distinguishes that doctrine in that country from the principles on which we
must settle it in this. These patents are derived from the grace of the monarch,
and the exclusive enjoyments of the profits of a discovery is not so much a right
inherent as it is a privilege bestowed ... Here, on the contrary, a citizen has a
right in the inventions he may make, and he considers the law but as the mode by
which he is to enjoy the fruits. Id. (emphasis in original).
Subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution, there seems to be some evidence of debate.
60. See supra 1. PROLOGUE - THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION: SUGGESTED
METHODOLOGY.
61. See Ramsey, supra note 21, at 16 ("The rights of an inventor to his invention at
common law were "secure" only so long as he could control them and that was just as long as he
could keep his secret... His rights were far from "secure". Therefore, it seems reasonable to
conclude that when this clause in the Constitution was drafted, it meant just what it says, that
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extrinsic evidence contrary to Jefferson's views, there is also
evidence that James Madison,6 2 the chief architect of the Constitution,
and Charles Pickney 63 had suggested using the words "to secure" and
similar rights language. 64
If one accepts that the utilitarian argument is flawed, it is
possible to do one of two things. The first is to adopt a "if it ain't
broke, don't fix it" approach. This approach argues, why bother
about the esoteric issue of justification when the system works,
inventions are at a faster rate than ever before, and society reaps those
benefits? To use a mathematical analogy, it is possible, sometimes, to
arrive at the right answer using the wrong reasoning. In almost every
case, one never gets full marks for doing that, simply because the
reasoning is wrong. The situation is compounded when it gets to
more advanced problems, where one will find that one has no choice
but to resort to first principles: "[a] wrong sum can be put right: but
only by going back till you find the error and working it afresh from
that point, never simply by going on.
'65
This is true of the patent system as well. When the problems get
more complex, one inevitably returns to the question of justification.
So, in a sense, the only viable option remaining is to explore the
alternative justifications for the patent system until one finds
satisfactory answers.
III. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE: NATURAL RIGHTS JUSTIFICATION
In this part, I will examine the natural rights theories which have
been raised as an alternative justification for the patent system. I will
Congress shall have powers to secure their rights."). Id. (emphasis in the original)
62. Madison's suggestion to the second draft of the Constitution debated on August 18,
1787 was for Congress to have the power "[t]o secure to literary authors, their copyrights for a
limited time and To encourage by premiums and provisions the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries." Ramsey, supra note 21. Although the emphasis is on copyrights,
Madison later wrote, "The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudicated in Great Britain
to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to
inventors." Id.
63. Pickney's suggestion for the second draft of the Constitution was that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o grant patents for useful inventions and to secure to authors exclusive rights
for a certain time." Id. Although Pickney's proposal seems to reinforce the view that patents
are granted (as a privilege), Ramsey argues that this was an incident of history because at that
time, copyrights had received more substantial recognition than patents. Id.
64. BUGBEE, supra note I at 129 ("The language of this Constitutional clause also
contained little that was new ... its immediate ancestry was plainly visible in Madison and
Pickney's proposals, which employed such terms as... 'exclusive rights' (but not property)").
Id.
65. C.S. LEWIS, THE GREAT DIVORCE 8 (1946).
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argue that a theory that focuses on natural rights without highlighting
natural duties is, at best, incomplete. At worst, a natural rights theory
runs into the same problem of justification as utilitarianism.
A. Natural Rights Theories
Like its utilitarian counterpart, the natural rights theory comes in
various forms but generally, it is the theory that "the rights of
inventors are of primary importance and the patent law exists to
protect these rights, irrespective of the consequences the grant of the
patent would have on the public welfare., 66  There are two
permutations to the natural rights theory which will be explored
below. The first is the theory that a patent is the "reward for services
rendered" (also known as the "fruit of one's labor" argument); and the
second is a pure natural rights theory of property.
1. Reward for Services Rendered (Fruit of One's Labor
Argument)
This rationale is based on both natural rights and economic
rights and can be summarized as follows:
A man has a right to receive, and therefore society is morally
obligated to give, reward for his services in proportion as these
services are useful to society. Inventors render useful services.
An exclusive privilege in the form of a monopoly patent is the
most appropriate reward to inventors.
67
or alternatively,
What a person produces with her own intelligence, effort and
perseverance ought to belong to her and no one else. Why is it
mine? Well, it is mine because I made it, that's why. It wouldn't
have existed but for me.
68
By its definition, this rationale is immediately limited by one
problem: if a person has a right to receive a reward for his inventions,
how should we measure the amount of the reward? Justifying the
patent system on this rationale suggests that market value is the
measure of the reward; in other words, leave it to the market to
66. See CHISUM ET.AL., supra note 57.
67. PENROSE, supra note 33, at 26.
68. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 19 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 31, 36
(1989).
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determine how useful the invention is. 69  The theory here is that
because resources are scarce, the price for which people are willing to
pay for a good is a reflection of how useful the good is.
However, arguably, this theory is flawed for the following
reasons:
* The market price does not always correlate to the labor
invested, nor for that matter, to the usefulness of the
good: For example, I can spend a lot of time and effort
inventing something nobody wants to buy, whereas
another may chance upon a bright idea in an evening,
which results in an invention that is an instant success.7 °
Also, the market price depends on other factors besides
one's labor: for example, the income distribution and
taste of the people who buy the product, existing
substitutes and other institutional arrangements. 7'
* This theory applies only to directly marketable
inventions: What about important scientific discoveries
which though not marketable, are, nevertheless, used to
invent marketable products? 72  Therefore, despite its
appeal, this argument is flawed if used as a justification
of the patent system, as it "is simply an argument for
rewarding inventors, and not at all an argument for the
patent method of doing it."
73
2. Natural Rights
The second rationale, which is a pure natural rights justification
of property, is slightly more persuasive. Generally, the argument here
is
[A] man has a natural property right in his own ideas, the
appropriation of which by another should be condemned as
stealing. Society is morally obligated to recognize this property
right. Property is in essence exclusive, and therefore an exclusive
privilege is the only appropriate way for society to recognize this
69. PENROSE, supra note 33, at 28.
70. ld. at 30-31.
71. Id. at 30.
72. Id.
73. Id. at31.
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particular right.
74
There are two alternative theories that have been advanced as
justifying intellectual property as the author/inventor's natural rights,
which are briefly described and critiqued below. A detailed critique
of each theory is outside the scope of this Article; it will suffice to
highlight the limitations in each theory.
a. Locke's Labor Theory
An alternative theory that is often advanced today as a
justification for intellectual property is the labor theory propounded
by English philosopher, John Locke.75 His theory can be summarized
as follows:
7 6
1. God gave the earth to people in common;77
2. Every person has a property interest in their own person;
78
3. Every person owns their own labor; 79
4. Whenever a person mixes their labor with something in
the common they make it their property; 80
5. The right to private ownership is conditional upon a
person leaving in the common enough and as good for
the other commoners; 81 and
6. A person cannot remove more out of the commons that
they can make use of (the "non-waste" condition). 82
Recall the first natural right rationale mentioned above-that a
creator is entitled to the fruits of one's labors. The Lockean theory
derives from that notion but expands on it to argue that as the person
is entitled to property as just desserts. In the context of intellectual
74. Id. at 22.
75. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287; Jeremy
Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual
Property, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 842 (1993); GORDON, supra note 12.
76. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 43, 44 (1996).
77. LOCKE, supra note 9, at ch. 5, 26.




82. Id. at 31 ("As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it
spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his
share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy."). Id.
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property, propertization of ideas can be justified by the following
propositions:
83
1. production of ideas requires a person's labor;
2. these ideas are appropriated from a "common" which is
not significantly devalued by the idea's removal; and
3. ideas can be made property within breaching the non-
waste condition.84
The Lockean labor theory has been subjected to much critique,85
and it is not my intention to dissect the theory in this Article. In the
patent law context, natural rights proponents have not been able to
surmount at least three major criticisms against a natural rights view
of patents.
* Patent Term - if patents were natural property rights, why
should there be a term limitation? "It would be logical to
espouse the cause of perpetual patents-a position which
led to unacceptable recognition that it forced the
recognition of the social element in the patent grant., 86
* Independent Creations - if the same invention was made
independently by another without reference to the first,
why should the second inventor be deprived of his natural
right to a patent just because he was unlucky enough to be
second in time?
87
83. Hughes, supra note 75, at 299. One of the objectives of his Article was to test the
strength of the Lockean justification. He concluded that Locke's theory presents a powerful but
incomplete justification of intellectual property, and that such justification should be
complemented by adopting Hegel's personality theory.
84. Id.
85. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 36-48 (1977); HUGHES, supra note
75, at 299-328; Hettinger, supra note 68, at 40-45.
86. PENROSE, supra note 33, at 24. This was a stumbling block for France. In part
because of their inability to reconcile the natural rights of the inventor within the context of the
patent system, in 1844, France adopted the utilitarian/social-contract view of patents.
Eventually, by 1884, the highest court in France had declared that there was no such thing as
intellectual property. Praeger, supra note 56, at 734 (citing BULL. COUR DE CASSATION, CIV.
131 (1887)). Praeger observed that the weakening of the notion of intellectual property in
France coincided with decline of France's relative industrial strength compared to her
neighbors. One can only speculate as to what would have become of the French patent system,
had it been able to justify intellectual property more cogently.
87. PENROSE, supra note 33, at 27.
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0 Justification of Rights - natural property rights themselves
must be justified. Writers have often stopped short at
simply endorsing the Lockean labor theory of property
rights without more. As I mentioned in the Introduction,
one criticism against natural rights is that "rights
themselves need to be justified somehow, and how, other
than by appeal to the human interests their recognition
promotes and protects? This seems to be the
uncontrovertible insight of classical utilitarians. '88
Hence, a theory that consists solely of natural rights, without
considering natural duties, is rooted in a false notion of liberty, and is
as extreme in its individualism as utilitarianism is with its
overemphasis on the collective good.
b. Hegel's Personality Theory
When used to justify intellectual property, the "personality
theory" articulated by German philosopher, Georg W. Hegel, has
been used to argue that "an idea belongs to its creator because the
idea is a manifestation of that creator's personality., 89 Elsewhere, the
Hegelian theory has been described to be a "personhood perspective;"
that is, "to be a person, an individual needs some control over
resources in the external environment." 90 "The necessary assurances
of control take the form of property rights."
91
It has been noted that this theory does seem to fit easily into the
patent law context because one tends to associate inventions with the
solution of specific problems, not an expression of one's personality.
For example, it has noted that Thomas Edison searched for the
filament material that would burn the longest, not one that would
reflect his personality.
92
Because of copyright law's concern to protect the expression of
an idea, the personality theory seems to be a better fit. However, I
agree with Hughes that the state of the art protected by patent law is
not all that different from the "art" protected by copyright law 93 and it
88. SCANLON, supra note 11.
89. Hughes, supra note 75, at 329.
90. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1981).
91. Id.
92. Hughes, supra note 75, at 340.
93. See Hughes, supra note 75 (arguing for a more expansive justification of intellectual
property to include a personality justification. Specifically at 340, he admitted that there were
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would be an "oversimplification to think that some genres of
intellectual property cannot carry personality. 94 For example, writing
a computer program can involve some vision; if there are ten ways to
write the program, the choice of one method out of the ten may
demonstrate personality.
95
It should be noted that the notion that ideas are a manifestation
of the creator's personality is not inconsistent with the Lockean
theory. There is at least one writer who argues that Locke "perceived
the fruits of labor to be an extension of the laborer's personality, and
since it was therefore part of the laborer's sphere of personality or
"suum," it should be protected from harm.",96 It is submitted that even
if the inventor's personality is manifested in the invention, the
Hegelian theory encounters the same difficulties faced by the
Lockean theory, when applied in the patent law context.97 Finally, I
respectfully disagree with Professor Radin's interpretation of
"personhood," her claim that "to be a person-an individual needs
some control over resources in the external environment. 9 8
Intuitively, it is possible that a person may feel that his existence
is validated by his control over the external, but that is different from
asserting that one's control over the environment is what makes him a
person. This conclusion will not go down well with many, but it
seems to be a logical extension of Professor Radin's personhood
perspective.
Other alternative definitions of personhood seem more
persuasive: one is the Judeo-Christian concept of human beings as
being made in the image of God, possessing qualities of reason, and
the knowledge of good and evil.991n other words, personality is what
separates humans from animals, that is, a human being, characterized
by his rationality, is an "end-in-itself."'
100
"more difficult problems for the personality justification" posed by "technological categories of
intellectual property" like patents, but argued that such technology "may not be categorically
different" from what is protected by copyright (like atlases and maps)).
94. Id. at 342.
95. Id.
96. GORDON, supra note 12 at 1609 (citing Karl Olivecrona, The Term "Property" in
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 61 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 109,
112-14 (1975)).
97. See BECKER, supra note 85.
98. Radin, supra 90, at 957.
99. JAMES W. SIRE, THE UNIVERSE NEXT DOOR: A BASIC WORLDVIEW CATALOG 27
(Intervarsity Press 1997).
100. See Wright, supra note 23, at 1860 ("Natural law theory is based on rational
reflection on the nature, conditions and experience of being a human being in a world with such
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Overall, I agree with the Hegelian theory insofar as it describes
one's ideas as being a manifestation of one's personality but it is not
substantial enough to justify the propertization of intellectual labor.
Hughes, who advocates adopting both the Hegelian and Lockean
theories, admits that there are weakness in the Hegelian theory: "a
property system protecting personality will have difficulty finding
indicia for when people do and do not have a "personality stake" in
particular objects.1 '' The personality justification also leaves some
nagging theoretical questions."'
10 2
IV. THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE: NATURAL LAW JUSTIFICATION
A. Classical Natural Law: A Suggested Predicate
Thus far, I have explored both the utilitarian and natural rights
justifications and found them lacking. The utilitarian justification
focuses on promoting inventions without due emphasis on the
inventor. On the other hand, the natural rights justifications focuses
on the rights of the inventor without due emphasis on the duties of the
inventor to the society at large. I submit that this conundrum cannot
be resolved until one accepts natural law as the starting point.1
0 3
In this Part, I will first justify the relevance of natural law to the
patent system. Next, I will explore some of the natural law theories
of property which influenced the writings of John Locke. A major
influence on Locke was the Dutch international law jurist, Hugo
Grotius 10 4 (1583-1645). Hugo Grotius, in turn, drew much of his
inspiration from St. Thomas Aquinas 10 5 (1225-1274).
Second, I will then deal with some objections to natural law.
other beings. As Finnis states, "By nature - that is, precisely as human beings, - all human
beings are both free and equal. "Free" here refers both to the radical capacity for free choices...
to be free is to be - unlike a slave - an end in oneself."). Id.
101. Hughes, supra note 75, at 339.
102. Id.
103. See GORDON, supra note 12 (adopting Locke's theory of natural law as a way of
reconciling individual and public rights). Gordon looks at natural law norms outside Lockean
theory and argues that a "properly-conceived" natural rights theory is necessarily concerned
with the rights of the public as well as with the rights of those whose labors create intellectual
products. Her essay, however, centers on copyright, reinforcing my observation on the scarcity
of writings focusing on patent law jurisprudence.
104. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRIS TRES (1625) (THE RIGHTS OF
WAR AND PEACE (F.W. Kelley, et. al. trans., Classics of International Law. New York: Oceana,
1964)) [hereafter, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis)]. This seminal work instituted a new approach to
questions of justice, especially international justice.
105. AQUINAS, supra note 13.
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And finally, I will argue that natural law is relevant to the U.S. patent
system. If a conscientious effort is made to think along such lines,
one may find that natural law provides some answers to the hard
questions which have not yet been satisfactorily answered by other
theories.
1. The Relevance of Natural Law
a. The Purposes of John Locke
Even those who support a Lockean system of intellectual
property law sometimes miss the point of why John Locke wrote his
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT in the first place. In his title page,
he clearly wrote that it was to refute the "false principles and
foundation of Sir Robert Filmer."'
06
Filmer (1588-1653) was a supporter of the monarchy and his
theory, based on the right of fatherhood, 07 argues that the Monarch,
who is the Father over many families "holds a natural, unlimited and
arbitrary right of private property."'1 8  Locke opposed this view
because of his belief in creationism-that because man is born subject
to God, not to man, he is born equal without subordination and
subjection."0 9 Hence, Locke's purpose in writing his Treatise was to
refute the idea of an absolutist and arbitrary rule of government and
re-establish natural law and the equality of man into political theory.
It is therefore, entirely relevant to look to the natural law tradition
from which Locke drew inspiration.
b. The U.S. Constitution and its Emphasis on Justice
The second reason why natural law is possibly relevant to the
patent law system can be located in the preamble of the Constitution.
Attempts to justify the patent system have always focused on the
Intellectual Property clause." 0 However, it should be noted, that
106. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 154.
107. JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND His ADVERSARIES 59
(Cambridge University Press 1980 (Filmer bases his right of fatherhood on the art of begetting
"[E] very Man that is born so far from being free, that by his very Birth he becomes a subject of
him that begets him."). Id.
108. Id.
109. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 1.53 ("They who say the Father gives Life to his Children,
are so dazzled with the thoughts of Monarchy, that they do not, as they ought, remember God,
who is the Author and Giver of Life: 'Tis in him alone we live, move and have our being' [Acts
17:28]"). Id.
110. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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clause and all other articles in the Constitution are preceded by the
overarching general principles of the preamble, which states that the
Constitution was established in order to "... . establish
Justice ... promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of
Liberty.""' The notion of justice and promoting general welfare (or
the common good) are one of the main concerns of natural law.' 1 2
Accordingly, it is arguable that the promulgators of the Constitution
intended to depart as little as possible from the principles of natural
law.
c. The Common Law Roots of the U.S. Patent System
Thirdly, there is strong evidence to suggest that the U.S. patent
system, modeled after the English Statute of Monopolies, has
common law roots. The common law is originally based on natural
law and in particular, Christian principles.' 13 It is arguable, therefore,
that natural law is a relevant consideration to the patent law inquiry.
It is generally believed that the U.S. patent system in its infancy
was largely influenced by and modeled after the English patent
system."14 It is believed that the framers of the first U.S. Patent Act of
1790 knew of no other form of European patents, with the limited
exception of French patent laws and the English common law relating
to patents.
1 15
It is therefore relevant to consider how the English patent system
developed. It has been somewhat erroneously suggested that the
English Statute of Monopolies of 1624 was the basis of the English
patent system. 1 6  The beginnings of the English patent law system
111. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
112. Wright, supra note 23 ("In both theory and everyday practice, the concept of justice
has long been thought to encompass not merely a formal equality.., but also a substantive
equality... The elaboration of this substantive equality and its implications for morality, justice
and law form the core of the "natural law" (or "natural right") theory of law..."). Id.
113. See JOHN C.H. Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 63-131 (1955) (tracing the connection
between Christianity and the common law. He stated that in his opinion, "while the Roman law
was a deathbed convert to Christianity, the common law was a cradle Christian"). Id. at 65.
114. See Walterscheid, supra note 28, at 698.
115. LOCKE, supra note 9.
116. Walterscheid, supra note 28, at 849 n.2) (citing CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1600-1800 (Cambridge 1988)).
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies provides an exception against monopolies:
Provided also, and be it declared and enacted, that any declaration, before-
mentioned, shall not extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the
term of fourteen years, or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or
making of any manner of new manufactures, within this realm, to the true and
first inventor and inventors of such manufactures...
20031
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can be found in its common law tradition, most notably in the 1602
case of Darcy v. Allin,117 known otherwise as The Case on
Monopolies, and by a later 1615 case of The Clothworkers of
Ipwich. "8
The critical contribution of Darcy v. Allin (endorsed by The
Clothworkers' case) was its pronouncement of an exception to the
rule that monopolies were prima facie against the common law and
statutes of England:
... [w]here any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own
wit or invention doth bring any new trade to the realm... and that
for the good of the realm: that in such cases, the king may grant to
him a monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects
may learn the same...119
Hence, a view that a patent's legal status derived entirely from
the Statute of Monopolies in 1623 is erroneous because "letters patent
for invention had legal status under common law, and the Statute was
largely a recapitulation of that law.,
120
The common law, itself, was based on classical natural law.
Lord Coke, the rumored author of the Statute of Monopolies, declared
that the "law of nature is part of the law of England"'' 21 and that the
"law of nature is that which God at the time of creation of the nature
of man infused into his heart for his preservation and direction; and
this is the lex aeterna, the moral law, called also the law of nature.'
' 22
And finally, it is submitted that natural law is relevant because
arguably, it is the only theory that is able to adequately and coherently
explain many of the more troubling questions which are explored
below.
Id.
117. Darcy v. Allin, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1602). In this case, a patent was originally
granted to one Bowes and another, Bedingfield in 1576, which was reissued in 1578 and in 1588
was reissued to Bowes alone. Bowes died before the expiration of the full term, so in 1598, the
patent was reissued to Darcy with a term of 12 years. The objection here was on the monopoly
held by the inventors.
118. Clothworkers of Ipswich Case, 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B. 1615) (endorsing Darcy, 74
Eng. Rep. 1131).
119. Darcy, 74 Eng. Rep. at 1139.
120. Walterscheid, supra note 28, at 880; BUGBEE, supra note 1, at 39 ("The chief
contribution made by the Statute of Monopolies of 1624 was to clarify and reinforce the existing
English law concerning patents of invention.") (emphasis added).
121. WU, supra note 113 at 91 (citing Lord Coke in Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377
(K.B. 1608)).
122. Id.
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2. What is Classical Natural Law?
There are different variations of natural law,' 23 but the essence of
natural law can be summarized as follows: "Natural law is an
assertion that there are objective moral principles which depend upon
the nature of the universe and which can be discovered by reason."
' 2 4
a. Grotius' Natural Law View of Property
Grotius starts from the premise that the nature of law is a divine
creation.125  To him, law is not arbitrary, even though it is the
command of an arbitrary divine ruler, because "He has drawn up
certain laws not graven on tablets of bronze or stone but written in the
minds and on the hearts of every individual, which even the unwilling
and refractory must read them.'
' 26
A very brief summary of Grotius' theory of property can be
stated as follows:
1. God conferred the natural world for the use of human
beings, in so far as that use is necessary for their
preservation.127
2. The term "property" (or its Latin equivalent, dominium)
did not always have the same meaning of exclusivity or
private ownership as it does today. 128 In the early days,
123. Very briefly, the history of natural law has four phases: that of ancient stoicism
(Aristotle, Cicero), that of the Middle Ages (Aquinas); that of 17'h and 18th century Protestant
Europe and finally, that of contemporary, mainly Catholic-inspired attempts at revival (Fuller;
Finnis).
124. M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 80 (6"h ed. 1994).
125. HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, GROTIUS ON THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 53
(R.V.D. Magoffin, trans., New York: Oxford University Press, 1916) (1609) [hereinafter, MARE
LIBERIUM]. Note that MARE LIBERIUM was published in 1609 but the discovery of the
unpublished treatise DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS in 1864 showed the former work to be
essentially Chapter 12 of the latter. See STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF
PROPERTY 6, n12 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991). The principal aim of MARE LIBERUM to
criticize the Portuguese who opposed the principle of freedom of the seas; but for our purposes,
we will focus on Grotius' appeal to the law of nature to justify his position.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. at 2; see also HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS 1. 1, ("Some things
belong to us by a right common to mankind, others by our individual right.") [hereinafter, DE
JURE BELLI AC PACIS].
Soon after the creation of the world, and a second time after the Flood, God
conferred upon all the human race a general right over things of a lower
nature... The enjoyment of this universal right then served the purpose of
private ownership; for whatever each had thus taken for his own needs another
could not take from him except by an unjust act.
Id. at II.2.ii.3.
128. DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, supra note 127, at 226-27:
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"property" was a universal use-right, that is, it was
merely the power to make use of what was not privately
used.
3. The practice exercising the use-right evolved to become
a form of private
4. property because some things, once used up, cannot be
re-used, without a diminution of their value. To some
degree, using may amount to using up, which leads to
the exclusion of use by others. A key feature of his
property theory is the fact that the creation of "the law of
property was established to imitate nature."'
2 9
5. Hence, although occupation is a conventional way of
acquisition of property, 130 it is by no means the only
way, because there was something natural about the
development of the institution of private property from
the basic and inherent human right to use the material
world and no agreement was needed. '31
6. "Rather, all that was necessary was labor of some kind.
Men had physically to take possession of the material
object or to alter it in some way: with respect to
movables, occupancy implies physical seizure; with
respect to immovables, it implies some activity
involving construction or the definition of
boundaries.'
132
It must be understood that, during the earliest epoch of man's history, ownership
[dominium] and common possession [communio] were concepts whose
significance differed from that now ascribed to them. For in the present age, the
term 'ownership' connotes possession of something peculiarly one's own...
whereas the expression 'common property' is that assigned to several parties...
with reference to the early age, the term 'common' is nothing more nor less than
the simple antonym of 'private' [proprium]; and the word 'ownership' denotes
the power to make use rightfully of common [i.e. public] property.
129. MARE LIBERUM, supra note 125, at 25; see also DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, supra note
118, at 229:
The recognition of the existence of private property led to the establishment of a
law on the matter, and this law was patterned after nature's plan ... This process
known as 'occupation' [occupatio], a particularly appropriate term in connexion
with those goods which were formerly at the disposal of the community.
130. Note though that Grotius' main purpose of writing MARE LIBERUM was to argue for
the freedom of the. seas, and he achieved his purpose by arguing that since the sea could not be
occupied in a way that imitates nature, the seas should be free.
131. See RICHARD TUCKER, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 61 (Cambridge University Press 1979).
132. Id. at 62 (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE LURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARUIS 217 (James
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7. A caveat to his theory of property was that the concept
of the original use-right constrains private ownership
through the right of necessity,'33 which comes in two
forms: i) the right to use things which have become the
property of another; 34 and ii) the right to such acts as
human life requires.1
35
Grotius justified the first necessity by looking at the purpose for
which private property was instituted:
We must, in fact, consider what the intention was of those who
first introduced the individual ownership; and we are forced to
believe that it was their intention to depart as little as possible from
natural equity. For as in this sense even written laws are to be
interpreted, much more should a point of view prevail in the
interpretation of usages which are not held to exact statement by
the limitations of a written form.
136
By linking natural equity to property ownership, Grotius presents a
model of property ownership that seeks to balance private and
universal use rights.
b. Natural Law as articulated by Aquinas
Just as Locke built upon the works of Grotius, the latter similarly
built his theory, particularly his idea of necessity, on the foundation
laid by St. Thomas Aquinas.137  It is therefore relevant to consider
Aquinas' views on natural law and on property.
Aquinas divided law into four categories: (1) the divine law (lex
aeterna), which is divine reason that is known only to God; (2) the
eternal law (lex divinia), which is the law of God found in Scriptures;
(3) the natural law (lex nautralis) which consists of participation in
Brown Scott ed., Gladys L. Williams trans., 1964)). Note that Locke's labor theory develops
and expands upon this theory and makes it the centerpiece of his labor theory.
133. Grotius was clearly influenced by Aquinas when he articulated the right of necessity.
Grotius interprets the right of necessity to mean that there is no general duty imposed on the
property holder to secure the welfare of the less fortunate but it operates in situations of direst
need and not when the need is genuinely unavoidable (for example, a needy is not entitled to
take from another in equal need, and it is to be treated as a debt to be repaid if possible.) See
BUCKLE, supra note 125, at 47 (citing DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS II.2.vii and II.2.viii-ix).
134. DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, supra note 127, at vi.
135. Id. at xviii. It has been argued that Grotius seems to treat this second necessity as the
right to trade in necessities, and is directed against politicians from restricting trade in such
necessities. The interpretation concludes that it is not a right to free trade per se but a right to
trade in necessary goods and to pay a fair price for them. See BUCKLE, supra note 125, at 48.
136. DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, supra note 127, at lI.2.vi. I (emphasis added by author).
BUCKLE, supra note 125, at 46.
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the eternal law by rational creatures; (4) and human law (lex humana)
which is positive law or human legislation, which is an application of
natural law to practical living, necessary to force selfish people to act
reasonably. 138 Under natural law, justice determines whether a piece
of legislation is law or not: a law that is unjust is not law at all.1 39
My focus will be on trying to bridge natural law with human law
in the context of patent law. This approach is not new, at least not in
the context of copyright law.' 40  For instance, Professor Gordon has
argued for a natural law approach towards copyrights by utilizing the
Lockean proviso of "enough and as good for."'
141
I shall, however, argue further that because of the unitary nature
of Aquinas' theory of laws, the eternal law, found in the Scriptures, is
equally relevant. At this point, the reader may be tempted to stop
reading especially if he or she does not espouse any religious
viewpoints or espouses one other than Christianity. I shall try to
confine my arguments as much to natural reason and not require the
reader to assume any faith. I shall, however, try to "steer between the
Scylla142 of imposing [my] faith upon others, as though it were a
matter of logical reasoning so that it would be irrational to reject it,
and the Charybdis 43 of refraining from altogether speaking about it,
as though faith were entirely irrelevant to the science of law."'
144
c. Aquinas's View on Private Property
Aquinas's treatise does not formally specify how property rights
are acquired, in fact, the Lockean and Hegelian theories of property
acquisition are foreign to him. 45 Aquinas, in fact, did not believe that
138. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at II Q91.
139. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE -THEORY AND CONTEXT (Carolina Academic Press,
2d 1999) (citing Augustine as saying "A law that is unjust seems not to be a law.").
140. See GORDON, supra note 12.
141. GORDON, supra note 12, at 1562 ("The provision that "enough and as good be left"
lies at the center of this Article's thesis: that creators should have property in their original
works, only provided that such grant of property does no harm to other person's equal abilities
to create or draw upon pre-existing cultural matrix and scientific heritage.").
142. In Greek mythology, Scylla was a sea monster who lived underneath a dangerous
rock at one side of the Strait of Messia, opposite the whirlpool, Charybdis.
143. Charybdis was another monster which sucked water in and out three times an day.
Both Scylla and Charybdis formed a dangerous threat to passing ships. The reference to
"between Scylla and Charybdis" means to be in a position where the avoidance of danger leads
to another.
144. Wu, supra note 113, at 222.
145. JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 189 (Oxford University Press 1988).
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everyone had a property in his "own" body."'146 However, Aquinas's
justification of property is somewhat similar to Locke's theory
because he recognizes "taking possession" as a basis of legitimate
possession because it is an appropriation of "what from the outset was
'common"' (i.e. available to all).
It is instructive to set out in full Aquinas' answer to the question
"Is it lawful for a man to possess something as his own?"
Two things are competent to men in respect to exterior things.
One is the power to procure and dispense them and in this regard it
is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary
to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more
careful to procure what is for himself alone that which is common
to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to
another which concerns the community, as happens where there
are a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs
are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with
taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would
be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing
indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured
to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be
observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no
division of things possessed.
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to their
external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess
external things, not as his own, but as common, so that to wit, he is
ready to communicate them to others in their need.
147
Aquinas's theory of private property can thus be summarized as
follows:
1. There is a hierarchy of goods and private property is only a
part thereof. 4 8 The highest good is God, who is the absolute
good. 149  There are relative goods: i) goods of the soul, ii)
goods of the body, and iii) external goods. Private property
falls into the third category.'
50
146. Aquinas may have a point here: even accepting Locke's labor theory arguendo, since
we are the product of our parents' labor, why should we own our bodies?
147. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at lia-liae, a.66 art.2.
148. See WILLIAM J. MCDONALD, THE SOCIAL VALUE OF PROPERTY ACCORDING TO ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS 47 (The Catholic University of America Press 1939) (a diagrammatic
presentation of Aquinas' hierarchy of goods).
149. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I a, q6, art. 2.
150. McDONALD, supra note 148, at 24.
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2. Appropriation or taking possession is one method of gaining
ownership to private property.1 51
3. Private property is simply a determination of the indefinite
right which all men have to the right use of the goods of the
earth. 
15 2
4. Private property is lawful and necessary because of human
nature's contradictory inclinations toward sloth and ambition
and therefore, private property is a good way of administering
human affairs in an orderly fashion. 153
5. There are two types of necessity: 154 i) absolute necessity
(resources one needs for the very survival of oneself and one's
dependents), and ii) relative necessity (which are resources
needed to fulfill one's responsibilities, for the support and
education of one's relatives and household, for maintaining
one's business, 155 profession, or vocation, for launching one's
children in such ways of life, for paying one's debts' 56 and
other genuine necessities).
6. "[E]verything one has is 'held as common' (or in common)" in
the sense that it is morally available, as a matter of right and
justice to anyone who needs it to survive. 151
7. One's excess (residuum; superflua) after making reasonable
provisions for both types of necessities mentioned above, are
held in common, in the sense that one has a duty of justice (not
merely charity) 158 to dispose them for the benefit of the
15 1. Other methods include (a) donation (b) contract (c) will or testament. See AQUINAS,
supra note 13, at Ia-liae q. 105 art 2.
152. McDONALD, supra note 148, at 29.
153. AQUINAS, supra note 13.
154. Id, at II-Il q. 32 a. 5c.
155. Id. at Il-It q. 32 a 6c.
156. Id. at 11-11 q. 31 a 3.
157. FINNIS, supra note 145, at 191.
158. Id. at 192 n. 26 ("Misleadingly (in some respects), Aquinas' main treatment of the
duty to make one's goods available to the poor (Il-I1 a.31 a. 3, q. 32 aa.5-10) is under the
heading of 'charity' (love of God and neighbor) rather than 'justice,' although it is outlined
again under justice (Il-I1 a. 66 a.7)").
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poor. 159 The poor have a natural right that the whole of this
residuum be distributed in their favor.
160
8. Finally, the true measure of one's needs is based on the bona
fide judgment of a practicable reasonableness, which includes
general justice and love of neighbor as one oneself. 161
3. Objections to a Natural Law Approach
A natural law approach is not problem-free; the same generality
which makes the natural law approach versatile in handling difficult
issues also makes a consistent application almost impossible.
However, these flaws pale in comparison with two fundamental
obstacles that may hinder the adoption of a natural law jurisprudence:
first, the problem of God, which is a fundamental premise in classical
natural law; and second, the seeming impossibility of objectivity in an
increasingly skeptical world.
162
a. Source of the Higher Law - What about Atheists
and Agnostics?
Classical natural law, as espoused by Aquinas, Grotius, and
Locke, assumes the existence of God and His gift of the commons for
the benefit of mankind.163 Understandably, one objection may be that
this approach is unacceptable in a secular and pluralistic society. To
this objection, I proffer the following responses for consideration:
First, it is submitted that classical natural law is rooted both in
faith and reason.164 Whilst these theories attribute the ultimate source
159. Id. at 192.
160. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at Il-Il q. 66 a. 7c.
161. FINNIS, supra note 145, at 194.
162. See Andrew Phang, Security of Contract and the Pursuit of Fairness, 16 JOURNAL OF
CONTRACT LAW 158, 174-183 (discussing the existence of God and the problem of objectivity).
163. AQUINAS, supra note 13 (referencing the divine and eternal law). Grotius premised
his thesis on "by the law of the nations navigation is free to all persons whatsoever" because
God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature... so that by the decree of divine
justice it was brought about that one people should supply the needs of another. MARE
LIBERIUM supra note 125, at 7. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 303 ("God, who hath given the World
to Men in common hath also given them reason to make sue of it to the best advantage of Life
and convenience.").
164. It has been argued that the reconciliation of faith and reason is a central feature of
Aquinas' work. See Phang, supra note 162, at 176 (quoting AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES, Bk 1, ch. 7 ("Now although the truth of the Christian faith... surpasses the capacity
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of law to God, they also derive and justify principles of law and legal
institutions from reasonable observations about human nature and
acknowledge the advantages and necessity of society, 165 a fact that is
also explicitly acknowledged by the utilitarians.
Second, earlier, I submit that many who claim to be
utilitarianists are, in fact, deontologists. 166 If this is true, I further
submit that deontologists are only one step removed from the
classical naturalist's view of a higher law that is rooted in God. True,
there will be competing theories about what that "higher standard"
should be, but it cannot be denied that in every case, whether it be a
philosophical debate, a mundane quarrel or in the patent context, an
original inventor whose novel ideas are stolen, the intuitive appeal is
always to a standard of fairness and justice.
But the nagging question is, how did you get the idea that things
are fair or unfair? It has been argued that "[a] man does not call a line
crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line." 167 This Article
does not intend to debate highly controversial theological issues.
Classical natural law, as articulated by Aquinas, believes that "reason
can be used to prove that God exists but cannot be used to force
persons to believe in that fact, which requires an act of will (in faith)
on the part of the persons concerned." 168 It suffices, for my purposes,
to convince the reader that there is an objective moral standard out
there, even if we all choose to disagree on what that standard is. This
brings me to the issue of objectivity.
b. Objectivity
Opponents of classical natural law may argue that objectivity is
not possible given the "significant differences of opinion as to the
extent of the actual relationship between morality and law in difficult
societies." 169  There are also the American Realists, most notably
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who hold the view that "[t]he life of
the law has not been logic- it has been experience."1 70  Another
of the reason, nevertheless [the] truth that the human reason is naturally endowed to know
cannot be opposed to the truth of the Christian faith... It is impossible that the truth of faith
should be opposed to those principles that the human reason knows naturally.")).
165. See supra note 13 (summary of Aquinas' theory of property and summary of Grotius'
theory).
166. See supra Part II B.Cracks in the Historical Justification.
167. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 45 (1972).
168. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at 2a2ae Q2 art 2.
169. Wright, supra note 23.
170. THE COMMON LAW I (Little, Brown & Co. 1990) (1891).
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commonly adopted view, adopted by both the utilitarians and the
realists, is that one should divorce the "is" from the "ought" and view
the law as a means to social ends, not as an end in itself, and
therefore, the law must always be judged in the light of its social
purpose.
In response, I submit the following counter-arguments for
consideration:
It has been pointed out that a statement that there is no
objectivity is, itself, an objective statement. 171
ii. It is true that there are many disagreements about what
are the "oughts" and "ought nots." Seemingly, this
disagreement reinforces the case against the possibility
of objectivity; yet, I submit that the very fact that this
disagreement exists proves the case for objectivity. 172
To use a recent example, most countries condemned the
September 11 attack on the U.S. Nonetheless, in the
subjective minds of the terrorists involved, that was the
right thing to do. Is this reasoning acceptable to the
subjectivist camp? I suspect not. My point is that when
the issue becomes no longer abstract but personal, one
inevitably tries to appeal to a standard that is objectively
good, bad, or decent, and in doing so, proves the reality
of an cbjective moral standard.
iii. Coming back to the U.S. patent system, it is a central
tenet of the patent system that objectivity is both
possible and mandatory. 73  Its focus on rewarding the
true inventor, and awarding patents only to inventions
171. See Phang, supra note 162 (arguing about the inevitability of objectivity ("Indeed,
even the argument that there are no objective truths is itself a truth-claim.")).
172. See C.S. LEWIS, supra note 167, at 25 (giving an example of a disagreement between
two people about which of their idea about New York is more or less true, and arguing that the
reason why your idea of New York can be truer or less true than mine is that New York is a real
place, existing quite apart from our imagination). If New York is only a figment of our
imagination, then how can any of us have truer ideas than the other. 1d. Lewis states "I
conclude then, that though the differences between people's idea of Decent Behavior often
make you suspect that there is no real natural Law of Behaviour at all, yet the things we are
bound to think about these differences really prove just the opposite." Id.
173. See F.O. Richey, Some Objective Tests, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 187 (1945) (The
recommendation of President Roosevelt's Patent Planning Commission was that "there shall be
a declaration of policy that patentability shall be determined objectively.").
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that are novel, new, useful, and nonobvious are all acts
which implicitly reinforce the concept of a set of
objective standards.
If you agree that there is some validity in my arguments above
(even if you do not agree completely with me), then there is some
common ground on which we can proceed to explore the
development of a natural law jurisprudence for the U.S. patent
system.
B. Application of Natural Law Principles to the U.S. Patent
System
To develop a natural law jurisprudence in the U.S. patent system
requires an identification of general natural law principles that can be
worked out into specific working principles. In the following
discussion, I will propose three natural law principles that are relevant
and applicable to the U.S. patent system. They are the principle of
fairness, the duty to act in the interests of the common good, and the
principle upholding the sanctity of human life, including that of the
human embryo. Under each proposed guiding principle, I will
discuss whether the current law is or is not consistent with natural law
principle and explore some reforms to the law.
1. Natural law's Equal Emphasis on the Rights of the
Inventor (Fairness Principle)
a. Inventors Rights Under Natural Law
As argued above, the U.S. patent law system is modeled after the
English patent system, which is based on the Statute of Monopolies
and the common law with its accompanying natural law concepts.
According to Lord Coke's exposition on the Statute of Monopolies,
for a patent to be valid under Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies,
it must be "granted to the first and true inventor."' 74 Prior to the
codification of the common law in 1561, a central justification (apart
from the other objective of stimulation of the English economy) of
Elizabethan policy was that persons who "introduce new things for
the benefit of the public should be rewarded for their efforts in doingSO.' 17 5
so ."7
174. Walterscheid, supra note 120, at 876 (citing Lord Coke's Institutes of the Laws of
England). "Coke was a major participant in the development of the laws relating to monopolies
in the first quarter of the seventeenth century." Id.
175. Justine Pila, The Common Law Invention in Its Original Form 5, University of
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These arguments are consistent with the natural rights theory
mentioned earlier. I suggest that the underlying theme here is the
principle of fairness, that is consistent with natural law principles.
b. Inventors 'Rights under the US. Patent System
The U.S. patent system has incorporated the natural law
principle in 35 U.S.C. § 102: "A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless. .. (f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be
patented."'' 76  Under the regulations, the applicant is required to
declare under oath that he "believes the named inventor or inventors
to be the original andfirst inventor or inventors of the subject matter
which is claimed and for which a patent is sought., 177 Indeed, if an
inventor is incorrectly listed on or omitted from an issued patent, the
patent may be invalid.
78
However, it is conceivable that a strict application of this
requirement may lead to unfair results, for example, where there was
an inadvertent mistake179 or where the patent application was
submitted without the true inventor's knowledge (and hence the
inventor could not have listed himself). 8° The patent system
responded to this unfairness problem by enacting amendments to
Section 116181 and 256,182 allowing applications to be amended and
patents to be corrected where inventors were included or omitted by
error and without any deceptive intention.
Melbourne, Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 18 (2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com.
176. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (f) (2002).
177. 37 C.F.R. § 1.63 (a)(3) (2002) (emphasis added).
178. See Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Techs., Ltd., 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10765 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
179. See e.g., In re Roberts, 263 F. 646 (1920) (describing a situation where it was proved
that a co-applicant who had no part in the invention was included through mere inadvertence).
Thankfully, in that case, the courts allowed the true inventor to file a continuation application so
that he could receive the benefit of the previous priority date. Id.
180. See Ex parte Benes, 1925 Commr. Pat. 75, (describing a situation where a sole
inventor was not allowed to amend his application to include another inventor).
181. 35 USC § 116 (2002) ("Whenever through error a person is named in an application
for patent as the inventor or through error an inventor is not named in an application, and such
error arose without deceptive intention on his part, the Director may permit the application to be
amended accordingly, under such term as he prescribes.").
182. 35 USC § 256 (2002) ("Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent
as the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent, and such error
arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the Director may... issue a certificate correct
such error.").
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c. Fairness as a Guiding Principle
In my opinion, the inventorship provisions of the Patent Act
achieves some measure of fairness to the inventor for his contribution,
even though it is not entirely problem-free, as is the case with all fact-
based inquiries into the intention of parties, the nature of an error and
the nature of the invention, and the contribution of each inventor.
Notwithstanding these problems, we can derive a principle of fairness
to the inventor as a guiding natural law principle in the determination
of cases.
It would be illustrative here to discuss the case of Lough v.
Brunswick Corporation183 and examine how the fairness principle
therein derived can be applied. In this case, a small-time Florida
inventor, Mr. Lough, who was also a repairman for a boat dealership,
invented a marine propulsion device for boats. He made some
prototypes and gave them to his employer and longtime friends (who
were also in the marine industry) to install on their boats. He did not
charge them for the prototypes nor did he attempt to sell the
invention. A year and a half later, he applied for and eventually
obtained a patent. The patent infringement suit was filed against
Brunswick Corporation, a major corporate player in the marine
-industry. The jury upheld the patent on grounds that the prior uses
were experimental and did not offend the public use statutory bar, and
consequently found infringement. 184
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the majority reversed the jury
decision on experimental use and found the patent invalid." 5 They
reasoned that the experimental use exception was a question of law to
be determined on a totality of circumstances and, quite reasonably,
singled out control as a critical factor. However, the majority went on
further to draw a bright-line test: "If he does not inquire about the
testing or receive reports concerning the results, he is not
experimenting."'
86
Although the majority accepted that on the undisputed findings
of facts there was no commercialization, they found that Mr. Lough
did not monitor the use of his prototypes, did not keep records or
183. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
184. Id. at 1114 (citing jury verdict at Lough v. Brunswick Corp., No. 92-799-CIV-T-21A
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (amended judgment); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., No. 92-799-CIV-T-21A
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 1995) (second amended judgment); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., No. 92-799-
CIV-T-21A (M.D. Fla. April 13, 1995) (permanent injunction)).
185. Lough, 86 F.3d 1113.
186. Id. at 1120.
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reports. Without such control, the majority found that there can be no
experimental use, stating, "[t]he law does not waive statutory
requirements for inventors of lesser sophistication."'
8 7
The court was not asked to waive any "statutory" requirements
or favor less sophisticated inventors. Indeed, to do so would offend
another natural law principle that one must have "no arbitrary
preferences among persons," which natural lawyer, John Finnis,
defines as a basic requirement of practicable reasonableness.1
88
Corporations have the right to have their day in court, provided it is
fair. It is submitted that if the courts found that there was
experimental use, which is really a question of fact that underlies the
legal question of whether the public use/on-sale bar applies, it would
not be waiving any statutory requirements. The only 'requirement' it
would be violating is its own rigid interpretation of what "control"
means.
An alternative, and in my view, a more enlightened approach,
was suggested by the dissenting judge, Circuit Judge Plager. The
issue, in his opinion, was "whether in fact the challenged use was
experimental"' 189 and "whether a reasonable jury, on all the evidence
before it, could have arrived at the conclusion it did."' 90 The issue is
not whether, on the facts, the courts are "persuaded Lough retained all
the control a well-designed test of the seals would have afforded."' 9'
Judge Plager opined that although Mr Lough did not put in the "set of
tight controls the majority would have wanted,"' 92 he did "what
seemed appropriate in the setting in which he worked: he waited to
hear from his test cases what problems might emerge and, hearing
none, at least none that convinced him he was on the wrong track,"'
' 93
he proceeded to patent his invention. In his words:
Yes, he failed to conduct his testing, his experiments with the
careful attention we lawyers, with our clean and dry hands, have
come to prefer. But, under all the facts and circumstances, it is
more likely than not that he was testing and perfecting his device,
rather than simply making it available gratis to members of the
public for what the law calls "public use". . . The jury chose to
accept Lough's view of events, and under that view there was
187. Id. at 1122.
188. See JOHN FINNiS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Clarendon, 1981).
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more than enough evidence to support a jury finding .... I believe
it is improper and unjust to deny Lough his victory at trial on... a
question properly put to and decided by the jury.194
If applied substantively and procedurally, a principle of fairness
would have decided the case in favor of Mr. Lough, and not simply
because he was a less sophisticated inventor. If anything, it is
arguable that in wrongly characterizing experimental use as a
question of law, the majority was waiving the statutory requirements
to the detriment of less sophisticated inventors.
d. Equitable Principles under Natural Law
Equity has been defined as the "power to meet the moral
standards of justice in a particular case... to mitigate the rigidity of
the application of the strict rules of the law."'1 95 Historically, the rules
of equity were based on the law of God but later, they were based on
natural justice or the laws of nature.' 96 However, as I argue in this
Article, these two concepts are not inconsistent.
e. Equitable Principles under the U.S. Patent System:
Independent Creations
One dilemma that proponents of a natural rights justification of
the patent system could not explain was why a second, independent
inventor cannot claim the patent rights.
I submit that it is possible to reconcile this objection applying
historically equitable maxims. In this case, one can argue that the law
prevails where the equities are equal. Hence, where the inventor can
show that he was the first to invent, and did not derive the invention
from another, he will be entitled to the invention. In this respect, it is
arguable that the U.S. system's "first to invent" system compared to
the "first to file" system adopted by most countries, is superior in
terms of giving due consideration to the rights of the inventor.
2. Natural Law's Emphasis on the Common Good (Duty
Principle)
The natural law perspective has substantial roots in the
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, "every law is
194. FINNIS, supra note 188 (emphasis added).
195. MCCLINTOCKON EQUITY I (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter MCCLINTOCK].
196. Id. at 6.
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ordained to the common good."' 97 In the Thomistic tradition, positive
laws can be derived from natural law in two ways. The first method
is direct or indirect deduction, for example, deriving a prohibition
against murder from the natural law proposition that the killing of
innocent persons is intrinsically unjust. 198 The second method is less
direct: the legislator is allowed to derive positive laws, not by
deduction, but by applying his practical intellect and creativity to
come up with a variety of schemes or legislation which are consistent
with natural law. 199
a. The Idea of the Patent System
The promulgation of patent legislation falls into the second
category. From the premise that the laws should promote the
common good, and the fact that inventions generally improve the
well-being of the society, one can deduce a secondary principle that
inventions should generally be encouraged. There are different ways
of promoting inventions, for example, the government could fund or
undertake research and development themselves. 200  The patent
system is another option, and a sensible one too, given the limited
resources of the government.20 1
b. The Patent Term & "Submarine" Patents
Having decided on the grant of a patent monopoly as the method
of fostering the common good, the idea of having a limited patent
term is perfectly justifiable within the legislative scheme. In the
modem context, the U.S. patent has a term of 20 years from the
earliest filing date.20 2  Previously, I noted that the natural rights
theorists were unable to explain why there should be a patent term
203limitation if patents were natural property rights. Under theproposed natural law approach, there is no objection to the idea of
197. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I1, Q. 90 Art 3.
198. See GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999).
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Hettinger, supra note 68, at 31-52 (suggesting that "increased government
funding of intellectual labor" should be "seriously considered").
201. Id., Hettinger makes the argument that the use of the patent system is paradoxical
because, citing economist Joan Robinson, "... the justification of the patent system is that by
slowing down the diffusion of technical progress it ensures that there will be more progress to
diffuse... Since it is rooted in a contradiction, there can be no such thing as an ideally beneficial
patent system."
202. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).
203. See supra Part If.
2003]
600 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19
having a limited term.
A more constructive topic of discussion may be how long that
term ought to be. Prior to June 8, 1995, the patent term was 17 years
from the date the patent issued20 4 This gave rise to the problem of
what is commonly known as "submarine patents." These patents
result from applications which are kept pending for many years
through appeals and continuations. One objection to this scenario is
that the applicant follows the related industry's development and
amends his application so that it covers technology that may not have
existed at the time of filing. When these submarine patents
eventually issue, the consuming public finds that it suddenly has to
bear the added costs of what they have assumed to be patent-free
technology.
20 5
A recent example of this is the recent case of Symbol
Technologies v. Lemuelson Medical, Education and Research
Foundation.206 Mr. Jerome H. Lemuelson filed his original patents in
1954 for machine vision and automatic identification technology. His
patent eventually issued some 40 years later, after many pending
applications. The assignee to the Lemuelson patent tried to enforce a
patent that against Symbol Technologies' bar code scanning
technology. On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the doctrine of
prosecution laches and held that the Lemuelson patents, which issued
after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution, were
unenforceable. 0 7  Judge Newman disagreed. In her dissent, she
argued that the patentee had fully complied with the statute and rules
and therefore, "unless one is prepared to abandon the rule of law in
favor of subjective preferences, when there is a statute, it must
prevail. 20 t Judge Newman's statement makes two assumptions: first,
that the majority's approach is subjective; and second, that the rule of
law approach she is proposing is somehow, more objective, and
therefore is a superior approach. I respectfully disagree with both.
204. In 1994, the United States and other countries agreed to the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) under the Uruguay Round trade negotiation under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). TRIPS provided that the term of patent
protection shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from thefiling
date. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, art.29 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
205. A prominent example is the many patents filed by Jerome Lemuelson, which have
been accused of being submarine patents. See K. Ferguson, 20/20 Foresight, FORBES, Apr. 19,
1999, http://www.forbes.com/1999/04/19/feat.html.
206. Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1370 (emphasis added).
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Contrary to Judge Newman's first assumption, the majority
reasoning can, arguably, be justified on objective facts and natural
law principles. It may be true that the majority's reasoning, which
relied heavily on stare decisis instead of principled reasoning, is
somewhat weak. However, the majority decision based on the
equitable defense of laches is justifiable. The natural law principle
that is applicable here is that where "a party has unreasonably delayed
the assertion of an equitable claim until the other party has acted...
so as to result in prejudice because of the delay, equity will hold the
party claiming the right to be guilty of laches and will deny relief to
him. '20 9 Given that the Supreme Court found that a prosecution delay
of 8 years to be objectively unreasonable, 210 a delay of 40 years
should, afortiori, be considered unreasonable.
However, delay alone will not create laches; the delay must
result in harm or prejudice.21' In the case of "submarine patents," the
harm can be located in the fact that the public was allowed to assume
that the technology was patent-free; inventors and corporations that
have invested much in designing around technology are harmed when
their patent pending technology is suddenly torpedoed by 'submarine'
patents.
As highlighted above, implicit in Judge Newman's dissent is the
assumption that the rule of law is an objective and presumably, fairer
approach, even though she concedes that "compliance with statutory
law can lead to inequity in individual cases. 21 2 Her approach is not
new. The rule of law approach was also purportedly justified as
having an "inner morality" by Lon Fuller,213 who advocated a
minimum set of rules which, if complied with, would give laws their
of legality.21 4  These rules include the need for rules to be
promulgated, to be understandable, and for retroactive rule-making
and application to be minimized.215
209. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 195, at 69.
210. See Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 264 U.S. 463 (1924).
211. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 195, at 69.
212. Symbol, 277 F.3d 1361.
213. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1969).
214. Id. at ch. 2.
215. Fuller states eight criteria of legality: (1) prospectivity (i.e. non-retroactivity), (2)
absence of impediments of compliance with the rules by those subject to them, (3) promulgation
of the rules, (4) their clarity, (5) their coherence with one another (6) their constancy through
time (enabling people to be guided by the rules), (7) their generality and (8) their congruence
between official action and declared rule. Id. The controversial aspect of Fuller's theory is his
claim that if fulfilled, these criteria constitute an "internal morality of law." Id.
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The philosophical argument, implicit in Fuller's writing and
explicit in Judge Newman's dissenting judgment, is that the
procedural approach rule of law, being free of subjective values, is
more objective and therefore, preferable. I will make a few
comments here.
First, I agree that a legal system based on the rule of law is more
likely to guarantee individual liberties than legal systems which do
not.216  Second, their approach is not procedural but substantive,
217because they make a moral judgment that all values are subjective.
As a substantive conception, it runs into the same problem of
subjectivity. Finally, and most importantly, as warned by Plato,
"whenever the rule of law enjoys ideological prestige evil men will
find it convenient to adhere to constitutional procedures and other
legal forms as a means of maintaining or enhancing their power.",
2 18
Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa are examples of the abuse
that can take place under the auspices of "law."
In returning to the Lemuelson patent, the question of how the
case should have been decided remains. The patent term of 17 years
from the date of issue was in fact changed to a term of 20 years from
the filing of the earliest application from which priority is claimed
after the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). 21 9 This change was not made applicable to existing
patents or to pending applications filed before the effective date of
June 8, 1995.220 Perhaps, for clarity and guidance to the general
public, Judge Newman is correct that further restraint on submarine
patents should be by statutory change. Pending any statutory change,
one can argue that on a natural law approach, submarine patents
ought to be unenforceable if there is unreasonable delay which harms
the public or if there are other legitimate legal grounds to attack the
validity of the patent (for example, if there is no adequate and
enabling written disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112.)
c. Pharmaceutical Patents
One of the challenges that may confront the U.S. patent system
216. For example, procedural laws tend to provide some minimum protection against
arbitrariness of government.
217. This, at least, is the implication in Judge Newman's statement that is cited at footnote
206.
218. PLATO, STATESMAN 291a-301d (Martin Ostwald ed. & J.B. Skemp trans., 1957).
219. CHISUM, NARD, SCHWARTZ, NEWMAN & KIEF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 831-832
(2ded. 2001).
220. Id.
NA TURAL LAW IN THE U.S. PA TENT SYSTEM
in the future is what sort of policy it ought to adopt towards
pharmaceutical patents in the event of a bioterrorist attack on public
health. There are no easy answers but, I will venture a few
observations.
I will first state the general perceived U.S. position on
pharmaceutical patents, and then discuss the dilemma faced by the
U.S. during the anthrax crisis after September 11, 2001. Finally, I
will examine the legal position after the November 2001 Doha
Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement. I will argue that the Doha
Declaration, instead of being a move in the "wrong direction" as
221some critics say, is consistent with the natural law approach,
notwithstanding the fact that there are details that require further fine-
tuning.
i. U.S. Policy on Pharmaceutical Patents
The U.S. has traditionally taken a protective stance towards
pharmaceutical patents, whereas the developing countries, especially
those affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, have argued for a
relaxation in patent protection.22 The arguments for both sides are
compelling. Developing nations, especially sub-Saharan Africa, have
staggering figures to show the severity of the AIDS epidemic.223
"Much of the problem is attributed to the prices charged by
pharmaceutical companies for their patented medications.'2 24 On the
other hand, developed nations and pharmaceutical companies argue
that relaxing patent protection reduces incentives for research and in
the long-run, harms both developing and developed nations.225
Furthermore, developed nations point to the TRIPs Agreement, where
221. Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries and the Doha
"Solution," Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 140 (2002),
http://papers.ssm.com/
222. E.g., the U.S. often accuses developing nations of piracy, and has initiated unfair
trade cases against such countries for inadequate intellectual property protection. See Alan 0.
Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited
Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263 (1992).
223. According to UN statistics, sub-Saharan Africa is the worst affected region, being
home to "29.4 million people living with HIV/AIDS. Approximately 3.5 million new infections
occurred there in 2002, while the epidemic claimed the lives of an estimated 2.4 million
Africans in the past year. Ten million young people (aged 15-24) and almost 3 million children
under 15 are living with HIV." UNAIDS Fact Sheet 2002,
http://www.unaids.org/worldaidsday/2002/press/factsheets/FSAfricaen.doc.
224. Sykes, supra note 221, at l.
225. Some industrial surveys have arrived at this conclusion. See C. TAYLOR & Z.
SILBERSTON, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 250-252, 263-266 (Cambridge
University Press 1973).
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developing countries agreed that patents must be made available to
"all inventions, whether products or processes," and should last "at
least twenty years from the date of the filing of a patent
application.
226
ii. The U.S. Dilemma During the Anthrax
Crisis
In 2001, the U.S. was confronted with threats of bioterrorism
when anthrax-contaminated mail was discovered, causing the deaths
of five people, and creating panic in a nation which was still reeling
after the tragedy of the September 11 attacks. Perhaps for the first
time, the international debate between developed and developing
countries over what constitutes the "common good" became an
intense domestic debate.2 27
Bayer held the patent to ciprofloxacin (Cipro) which was
generally recognized as an effective vaccine against anthrax. The
anthrax scare had sent tens of thousands of people rushing to purchase
Cipro, causing a national shortage and fears that there were
insufficient Cipro to go around.228  One possible solution was to
purchase generic Cipro.22 9  However, generic Cipro has not been
approved for manufacture by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) even though some companies had purportedly met the safety
requirements. 230 The Hatch Waxman Act prevents generic drug
companies from proceeding with an abbreviated new drug application
if there was an unexpired patent and the patentee opposed the
introduction of generics. Bayer's patent on Cipro is still valid and
expires only in December 2003.231
The legal issue faced by the federal government, in particular,
the Health and Human Services Department (HHS), was whether they
could override Bayer's patent. Applying FDA laws would uphold
Bayer's patent, but applying another federal law would mean the
federal government could essentially override Bayer's patent. 28
226. TRIPS, supra note 204, at art. 33.
227. See Anthony dePalma, Handle With Extreme Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at
§3.
228. See Jessica Reaves, Drug of the Moment, TIME, Oct. 18, 2001,
www.time.com/time/nation.
229. See Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma, AM. LAW., Jan. 8, 2002, available at
http://www.law.com.
230. Id. (citing Senator Charles Schumer as saying that "at least five companies had
facilities approved by the Food and Drug Administration to manufacture the generic versions of
Cipro.").
231. Id.
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U.S.C. §1498, a historical provision enacted during World War II,
allows unlicensed manufacturers to sell their products to the federal
government without fear of patent infringement litigation:
232
[W]henever an invention.., covered by a patent... is used or
manufactured by or for the United States without license of the
owner.., the owner's remedy shall be by action against the
United States in the... Court of Federal Claims for his reasonable
and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.233
Unlike Canada, the U.S. never had to make a formal stand on the
legal issue. When faced with this same issue, Canada initially
ignored Bayer's patent and signed an agreement with a generic
manufacturer to stockpile Cipro.234 Canada eventually rescinded their
generic deal in return for discounted rates by Bayer, and their deal
paved the way for the U.S. government to negotiate a similar deal
with Bayer. Eventually, Bayer agreed to sell up to 300 million Cipro
tablets at 95 cents per tablet,235 which was half the original price,
resulting in $82 million in savings for the U.S. government.236
During this crisis, the Secretary of HHS, Tommy G. Thompson,
was criticized for taking what seemed like an equivocal stand on
whether to override the Bayer patent.237 He tried to avoid the issue by
saying that there was enough Cipro. When pushed, Thompson was
reported to have said in Congressional hearings that he was prepared
to go to generic companies if Bayer did not cooperate, but failed to
mention aloud the eminent domain provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.238
At its heart, the debate is over different concepts of what is the
"common good". Some argue that the readiness of the government to
override patent rights would deter pharmaceutical companies from
developing drugs that would help fight bioterrorism in the future.
239
The pro-public health was focused on the present "common good"
that was being harmed. As one critic said, "[t]he U.S. will respect the
232. Fleischer-Black, supra note 229.
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).




238. See Government Threatens Bayer Patent Suspension Unless Cipro Prices Are
Lowered, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 12, 2001, http://www.sfgate.com.
239. Id. ("If the federal government is going to threaten to break valuable patent rights at
the first sign of a crisis ... it will likely serve as a significant deterrent to other drug companies
who would like to do the 'right thing' and use their R&D capabilities to help the government
fight bioterrorism.").
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patent right, even if it means endangering public health. That's a hell
of a lot of respect, I must say.,
240
The criticism of Mr. Thompson seems, perhaps, unduly harsh.
After all, both sides had seemingly valid arguments, and if one were
in his position, one might be similarly hard pressed for the "right"
response. However, Mr. Thompson could have avoided some of the
criticism if he had emphasized the right of eminent domain under
§ 1498.241
Arguably, the abovementioned provision provides a solution to
the legal impasse, and would have avoided the semblance of what
appeared to be arbitrary, strong-arm tactics of the government
overriding the rights of patent owners. The historical background to
§ 1498 shows that it is not meant as a carte blanche for the
government to override patents, but should only be used sparingly
during times of national emergency, for example during World War II
when the government needed to produce huge supplies of wartime
weapons. 242 What requires legal fine-tuning is what constitutes a
"national emergency," perhaps through a vote passed by the
democratic process.
Also, § 1498 refers to "reasonable compensation." 243
Compulsory licensing, coupled with just and fair compensation may
represent a credible attempt towards reconciling patent owners' rights
and the common good. After all, according to estimates, it costs
Bayer 20 cents to make one Cipro tablet which it sells at $4.67 per
244tablet. I venture a tentative (although I would argue, not
unreasonable) guess that an intermediate figure can be arrived at with
further statistics and calculation that would provide sufficient
economic incentives for research and development but which would
provide urgent health care to the public in times of emergency.
iii. The Doha Declaration
A month after the Cipro patent dispute was settled, the U.S. and
other nations passed the Doha Declaration on the WTO Agreement on
TRIPs. 245 Though the Doha Declaration may require fine-tuning, it
arguably, makes some progress towards reconciling patent rights and
240. Fleischer-Black, supra note 229 (quoting an economist, James Love).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).
242. Fleischer-Black, supra note 229.
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).
244. See Fleischer-Black, supra note 229.
245. The Fourth Ministerial conference was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.
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the duty towards the common good. For the same reasons stated
above on §1498, the clarification on compulsory licensing for public
health crises is the best solution to what would otherwise be an
irreconcilable chasm for an urgent problem.
Under TRIPs, there are a few possible provisions that may limit
patent rights:
Article 27.2 provides that "[m]embers may exclude from
patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of
which is necessary to protect ordre public...
including to protect human... health... provided
that such exclusion is not made merely because
the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
2 4 6
This exception requires that the inventions
themselves must be harmful to the public in the
first place, and would be inapplicable to useful
pharmaceutical patents.
Article 30 states that "[m]embers may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a
patent, provided that such exceptions do not
reasonably conflict with normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner. .."247
This widely-worded exception is not usually
relied on as a solution and it would be very
difficult to justify that stockpiling generic drugs
does not conflict with "normal exploitation of the
patent" or is not unreasonably prejudicial.248
Article 31 is most pertinent to the issue of pharmaceutical
patents. It allows a member country to authorize
compulsory licensing, provided it has satisfied
certain conditions. For example, it must be
preceded by efforts to negotiate a license over a
246. TRIPS, supra note 204, at art. 27.2.
247. TRIPS, supra note 204, at art. 30.
248. See Sykes, supra note 221.
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"reasonable period of time ' 249 although this
limitation may be waived in a "national
emergency., 250  The right holder must also be
paid "adequate remuneration... taking into
account the economic value of the
authorization., 25 1  The use must also be
"predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market.
252
The Doha Declaration 253 purported to clarify Article 31,
providing, inter alia, that:
a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in
its objectives and principles. 254
b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences
[sic] and the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licences are granted. 255
c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, it being understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.256
d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement
249. TRIPS, supra note 204, at art. 31 (b).
250. Id.
251. Id. at art. 3 1(h).
252. Id. at art. 3 1(f).
253. This refers to the Fourth Ministerial conference held in Doha, Qatar in November
2001.
254. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
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that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights is to leave each Member free to establish
its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge,
subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of
Articles 3 and 4.257
The Doha Declaration may be unduly broad and subject to
possible abuse. For example, whilst I agree that public health crises,
as listed and which are supported by credible statistics, would be
fairly interpreted as national emergencies, a carte blanche
interpretation would be overly liberal. A more in-depth critique of
the Doha Declaration is discussed elsewhere,25 s but I suggest that its
approach on compulsory licensing and adequate remuneration for
public health crises, like the U.S. equivalent of § 1498, may represent
a credible attempt at balancing both the rights and duties of inventors.
Future, and more beneficial, debate ought to focus on what
constitutes "adequate" remuneration. For example, it has been
suggested that adequate remuneration should take into account both
successful and unsuccessful research for the same medical problem;
or that "cash-strapped developing nations might be permitted to
spread payments out over time in a sensible fashion under this
standard, as long as the present value of the payment stream
represented a reasonable return on R&D expenditures. 259
3. Natural Law's Emphasis on the Sanctity of Human Life
and Human Dignity: Genetic Engineering and Human
Cloning
"There will be no patents on monsters, at least not while I am
Commissioner"
260
"2002 will be the year of the clones.. .The genie is already out of
the bottle. Let's make sure it works for us, not against us. Let's do
it here. Let's do it right."
261
257. Id.
258. See Sykes, supra note 221.
259. Id. at 24.
260. Charles McManis, Re-engineering Patent Law: The Challenge of New Technologies,
2 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (2000) (quoting U.S. Patent Commissioner, Bruce Lehman),
http://law.wustl.edu/Joumal/2/plmcmanis.pdf.
261. See MSNBC News Services, Genie out of the Bottle on Cloning, MSNBC.COM, May
15, 2002 (quoting fertility expert Panayiotis Zavos), available at
http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/752767.asp.
2003]
610 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19
The debate on cloning was revived in late December 2002 with a
bold claim by a French company, Clonaid, announcing that it had
successfully cloned a baby named "Eve." This eventually was ruled
by most to be a hoax, when Clonaid failed to produce the cloned
baby.262 Even if the Clonaid claim was a hoax, it has been reported
that "there are at least two other laboratories reportedly working to
produce human clones." 263 What is not a hoax, though, is the fact
that on February 14, 2003, the first animal cloned from an adult cell, a
sheep named Dolly, was euthanized due to a progressive lung
disease.264 These events were followed on by a flurry of legislative
activity to be explored below.
First though, a working definition of the technology is in order.
Genetic engineering has been described as the "process by which
scientists alter or add specific genes to the genetic material present in
the embryo so that an individual could be born with characteristics
that he or she would not have had otherwise. ', 265 Cloning, by itself, is
266
not genetic engineering. Human cloning involves the duplication
of human fetus which would develop into a human being. It has been
said that "when the techniques of cloning and genetic engineering are
combined.., the human species will gain control over its own
destiny. '267
In this final section, I ask the question: "should human clones be
patentable?" Under a natural law approach, I would argue that the
answer is no. I will also explore the positions taken by the USPTO
and U.S. legislation.
Although there is some consensus on human cloning, there is
still much controversy over many of the following issues:
0 Definitions - What does it mean to be "human"? Would
be all right to clone parts of the human, if we do not
clone an entire human embryo? This brings about the
familiar pro-life/pro-choice issue of when life begins and
the process of creation. (Ultimately, I argue that one
262. Debbie Nevins, Double Take, TEEN NEWSWEEK, Jan 15, 2003,
http://www.msnbc.com/news.
263. Id.
264. See Press Release, Roslin, We are sorry to report that Dolly the Sheep is dead (Feb.
14, 2003), http://www.roslin.ac.uk/news/press/articles/174.html.
265. LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: How GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING WILL
TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 151-52 (Avon Books 1997).
266. Id. at 152.
267. Id. at 152.
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cannot remain neutral on this issue, because there is a
real possibility that in our lifetime, or at least in our
children's, the consequences of genetic engineering and
cloning will impact us, for better or worse.)
* Limits of cloning - save for a small minority, like
fertility expert Dr. Panayiotis Zavos, there seems to be
some general consensus that some human cloning,
specifically reproductive cloning, ought to be banned.268
The point of contention is the extent to which human
cloning should be banned. For example, should
therapeutic cloning, i.e. cloning to create embryos to
produce stem cells, which are then used to produce
material for the treatment of diseases like Parkinsons's
and Alzheimer's disease, be allowed?
I take the position that to uphold the sanctity of human life, the
right thing to do is to ban all cloning. First, I will examine the legal
position on human cloning. I will then set out arguments both for and
against cloning. Finally, I will argue that it is not too late to make
legal and ethical changes, even if the "genie is out of the bottle., 269 I
will suggest some ways in which the existing patent laws can be used
and reformed to draw the line between science and morality.
a. The Legal Position on Human Cloning
The U.S. PTO's policy has, reportedly, been that human life
cannot be patented.270 However, it has been observed that the PTO's
position is just-a policy which "is subject to change, to court
challenge and to simple oversight by patent examiners.,
27t
What is needed are clear laws, which are, unfortunately, lacking
268. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 47. As of Nov. 2001, "24 countries have banned
reproductive cloning... In 1998 the Council of Europe approved an Additional Protocol to its
Convention on Human Rights and Dignity with Regard to Biomedicine, banning human
cloning... The U.S. Congress was just a number of other legislatures deliberating on similar
measures. The French and German governments have proposed that the United Nations enact a
global reproductive cloning ban." Id.
269. See Genie Out of the Bottle on Cloning, MSNBC.COM, May 15, 2002,
http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/752767.asp [hereinafter Genie Out of the Bottle].
270. See Justin Gillis, A New Call for Cloning Policy, WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 2002
(quoting Brigid Quinn, spokeswoman for the U.S. PTO, saying, "Our policy has not changed. It
is not changing. We do not patent claims drawn to humans.").
271. Id.
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at the present time. Patent caselaw has not had to deal with this issue
specifically, although its position on patentable subject matter has
traditionally been extremely liberal since the 1980s, following the
case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.27 2 In this case, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that that a living and genetically engineered bacterium was
273patentable subject matter. This liberal judicial approach led to a
surge of patents applications for genetically-altered life forms.
While there is a patchwork of state legislation banning human
cloning to some degree,274 there is no specific federal law yet that
renders cloning or other genetic modification of humans illegal or
prevents cloned products of such processes from being covered by
patents. That may soon change however; on February 27, 2003, the
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003275 was passed in the House
of Representatives by an overwhelming vote of 241 to 155.276 If
passed into legislation, this Act "would ban all human cloning,
including cloning to create a pregnancy or for medical research[;] [i]t
also would make it a crime to 'receive or import a cloned human
embryo or any product derived from a cloned human embryo,' with
fines of $1 million and 10 years in prison.2 77
Proponents of the total ban, including U.S. President George
Bush, have urged the Senate to pass this bill into law. Anything other
than a total ban, it has been argued, "would license the most ghoulish
272. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
273. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
274. See National Conference of State Legislatures website, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/Genetics/rt-shcl.htm (reporting that as of January 22,
2003, six states have laws pertaining to the use of human cloning, which was first addressed by
the state of California with a ban on human cloning in 1997). The other five states are
Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, Virginia and Iowa.
In addition to prohibiting the creation of human embryos for the purpose of
initiating a pregnancy, Michigan and Iowa extend their restrictions to the creation
of human embryos via cloning techniques regardless of the intended use.
Virginia's law also was intended to prohibit human cloning for any purpose, but
the law does not define human being, which could be interpreted as from the
moment of fertilization onward, from the fetal stage onward or beginning at
birth. Finally, Missouri forbids the use of public funds for human cloning
research.
Id.
275. A similar bill known as the Brownback-Landrieu bill, S. 1899, 107h Cong. (2002),
[hereinafter Brownback-Landrieu] was passed last year but it stalled in the Senate. See Sheryl
Stolberg, House Republicans Press Senate on Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002.
276. See Maggie Fox, US House Votes to Ban Human Cloning, REUTERS, Feb 28, 2003,
http://story.news.yahoo.com
277. Id.
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and dangerous enterprise in human history. 278 On the other hand,
opponents of this bill have argued that a total ban would also ban
279important research like therapeutic cloning. In therapeutic
embryonic cloning, stem cells from an embryonic clone are inserted
into a diseased organ to grow healthy tissues. In scientific terms,
embryos are pluripotent because they have the ability to develop into
all or nearly all of the tissues of the human body.280 The human
embryonic clones are destroyed thereafter.
It remains to be seen how the Senate will vote on this issue.
Even if the Senate delays its vote, there may, conceivably be in the
near future, a case where the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court, or
the PTO has to deal with this issue. Advocacy groups have reported
that they have uncovered a patent that can be interpreted as applying
to cloned human beings.281 There could conceivably be another case
where anti-biotech activists like Jeremy Rifkin282 would seek a patent
on human/animal chimeras and possibly provoke an interference.283
278. See BBC, US House Passes Cloning Ban, Feb. 28, 2003 (quoting Republican
representative Sue Myrick), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2806843.stm [hereinafter
BBC].
279. Id. (quoting Democrat representative James McGovern as saying that the bill would
"close the door to important research" using what is known as therapeutic cloning.").
280. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: A PRIMER,
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/primer.htm [hereinafter NIH].
281. U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 on a method of developing pigs whose organs could be
transplanted to save humans. The patent claims "the cloned products produced by these
methods," Id., but unlike patents of this type, this patent fails to include explicit language saying
that the mammal in question does not include human beings. The view that the broad language
can extend to humans is not without merit. In MSM Investments v. Carolwood, 259 F.3d 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2002), the courts interpreted a claim to a "method of feeding... an animal" to extend
to humans. Id.
282. Jeremy Rifkin, who founded the advocacy group "The Foundation on Economic
Trends," is an active critic of biotech.
283. Rifkin and researcher Stuart Newman had applied for a patent application to create
human-animal chimeras, moving genetic material from one species and placing it into the
embryo of another. Although these inventors stated that they had no intention of using the patent
to produce chimeras, they list as a possible application the production of organs for transplant
into humans. Their objective was to obtain standing to be able to declare interference
proceedings when similar patents are filed. PTO released a statement within days stating that
patents on part human inventions are not allowed, because it would violate public policy and
morality aspects of the utility requirement. See Margaret A. Clark, Ethical Issues, FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/organfarm/regulators/clark.html. The PTO
cited Justice Story's statement of the utility requirement which excludes inventions that are
"injurious to the well-being, good policy or good morals of the society." Lowell v. Lewis, 15
Fed. Cas. 1018 (C. C. D. Mass. 1817).
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b. Pro-Cloning Arguments
There are two main arguments made in favor of human cloning,
namely, the argument against repression (the libertarian argument)
and the argument that a ban on all cloning deprives society of
potential benefits (the utilitarian argument). A third reason argues
that since it is too late to stop the advance of cloning, we might as
well embrace it.
i. The Libertarian Argument Against
Repression
This argument was made in a petition letter signed by 40 Nobel
Laureates opposing the Brownback-Landrieu bill, 284 stating:
By declaring scientifically valuable biomedical research illegal,
Senator Brownback's legislation, if it becomes law, would have a
chilling effect on all scientific research in the United States. Such
legal restrictions on scientific investigation would also send a
strong signal to the next generation of researchers that unfettered
and responsible scientific investigation is not welcome in the
United States.
285
It is interesting to note though, that in the same petition, these
Nobel Laureate petitioners pressed for a ban on reproductive cloning.
This is an implicit acknowledgment that some limits are necessary in
the search for knowledge. I submit that limits are necessary because
knowledge is not purely objective, but can have a commodity value.
Limits are also necessary on an issue as important as biotechnology,
because we cannot always rely on the self-restraint of scientists to do
the "right" thing. In particular, it has been noted that when the U.S.
biotech industry spends nearly $11 billion on research in the year
2000 alone and employs over 150,000 people, "most biotechnology
companies simply do not have the incentives to observe many of the
fine ethical distinctions that will need to be made.' 286 Hence, the only
compelling argument in favor of cloning rests on its argument that
there are possible societal benefits that will be lost if therapeutic
cloning is banned.
ii. The Utilitarian Argument Against Societal
Benefits
284. Brownback-Landrieu, supra note 275.
285. See Statement by 40 Nobel Laureates Regarding Cloning, The American Society for
Cell Biology, Apr. 10, 2002, http://www.ascb.org/publicpolicyiNobelletter.html, [hereinafter
Statement].
286. FUKUYAMA, supra note 47.
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In the above mentioned petition, the Nobel Laureates argued that
the Brownback-Landrieu bill "would impede progress against some
of the most debilitating diseases known to man:"
For example, it may be possible to use nuclear transplantation
technology to produce patient-specific embryonic stem cells that
could overcome the rejection normally associated with tissue and
organ transplantation. Nuclear transplantation technology might
also permit the creation of embryonic stem cells with defined
genetic constitution, permitting a new and powerful approach to
understanding how inherited predispositions lead to a variety of
cancers and neurological diseases such as Parkinson's and
Alzheimer's diseases.
287
There are empirical problems with this utilitarian argument: how
do you weigh the harms and benefits of such genetic engineering,
especially when the harms may not show up until many years later?
The post-mortem examination of Dolly may provide some insight into
this problem. If there is a link between the fact that she was a clone
and her death, "it will provide further evidence of the dangers
inherent in reproductive cloning and the irresponsibility of anybody
who is trying to extend such work to humans."
288
Also, how does one measure the cost of a human embryo, which
some regard to be human life? Even if you take the view that up to a
certain stage, the embryo is not life, there are other consequences of
genetic engineering that are not factored into the equation. For
example, pro-cloning expert, Professor Lee Silver, himself admits that
the dilemma of genetic engineering: the slippery slope is that the
advance of science may move beyond merely therapeutic cloning,
into genetically altering the genes of children. On this issue,
Professor Silver writes "while each individual use of the technology
can be viewed in the light of reproductive choice-with no ability to
change society at large-together, they could have dramatic,
unintended long-term consequences. 289
One of the harmful consequences he foresees is the further
stratification of society into the gene-enriched people, whom he calls
GenRich, and the rest of us, whom he calls Naturals. He draws this
possible long-term scenario:
[A]fter three hundred years of selection and enhancement, these
287. Statement, supra note 285.
288. BBC, supra note 278 (quoting Professor Richard Gardner, chair of the Royal Society
working group on stem cell research and therapeutic cloning).
289. SILVER, supra note 265, at 11.
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GenRich individuals have athletic skills that are clearly
"nonhuman" in the traditional sense. It would be impossible for
any Natural to compete ... If the accumulation of genetic
knowledge and advances in genetic enhancement technology
continue at the present rate, then by the end of the third
millennium, the GenRich class and the Natural class will become
the GenRich humans and the Natural humans - entirely separate
species with no ability to cross-breed, and with as much romantic
interest in each other as a current human would have for a
chimpanzee.
290
Advocates of embryonic cloning ought to remember that there
are alternatives to embryonic stem cells. Stem cells are cells which
have the "ability to divide for indefinite periods in culture and to give
rise to specialized cells., 291 Research studies have shown that adult
stem cells have the ability to form multiple types of tissue.292  Adult
stem cell research would avoid the ethical implications of embryonic
stem cell research; as in the former case, cells are taken from the body
of a living person. Admittedly, there are problems with adult stem
cells. 293 However, there are promising lab results, 2 94 which may be a
"demonstration that adult stem cells are not necessarily locked into
their current fate and furthermore, we can re-program them into
becoming other cell types.,
295
290. Id. at 5-8.
291. NIH, supra note 280.
292. See NIH BACKGROUNDER ON STEM CELLS, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (2003), http://www.nih.gov/news/backgrounders/stemcellbackgrounder.htm. E.g.,
until recently, it was thought that stem cells were not present in the adult nervous system, but, in
recent years, neuronal stem cells have been isolated from the rat and mouse nervous systems.
The experience in humans is more limited. In humans, neuronal stem cells have been isolated
from fetal tissue and a kind of cell that may be a neuronal stem cell has been isolated from adult
brain tissue that was surgically removed for the treatment of epilepsy. Id.
293. The NIH notes two limitations: adult stem cells have not been isolated for all cell and
tissue types, and adult stem cells are present in only minute quantities, are difficult to isolate and
purify, and their numbers may decrease with age. See id.
294. University of Minnesota, Adult Bone Marrow Stem Cells Can Become Blood Vessels,
Jan. 30, 2002 http://wwwl.umn.edu/urelate/newsservice/newsreleases/0201lstemcells.html
(stating that their findings "suggest that these adult stem cells may be an ideal source of cells for
clinical therapy. For example, we can envision the use of these stem cells for therapies against
cancer tumors by, for instance, introducing anti-angiogenesis genes. Or, they could be used to
heal wounds such as ulcers or diabetic wounds or to treat atherosclerosis.").
295. BBC, Stem Cell Therapies May Grow Tissue, Feb 11, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/health/ (quoting Farshid Guilak, Director of Orthopedic
Research at the Duke University Medical Center).
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iii. The Pessimistic Argument That It is Too
Late
This argument was made by Dr Panayati Zavos when he
predicted cloned babies to arrive by the year 2002. He argues in
favor of cloning simply because "the genie is already out of the
bottle., 296 This argument is a non sequitur-it is never too late to
stop the advance of science although as time goes on, it gets harder.
As suggested by Francis Fukuyama, we "need at all costs to avoid a
defeatist attitude with regard to technology that says since we can't do
anything to stop or shape developments we don't like, we shouldn't
bother trying in the first place. 297
c. Anti-Cloning Arguments: Human Dignity
I have already set out some responses objecting to the libertarian
and utilitarian arguments for cloning. However, the key objection
against cloning based on a natural law approach is the natural law
principle that upholds human dignity on the basis that human life,
even in its embryonic form, is sacred.298 Natural law holds the
fundamental normative principles of fairness and of rights and
wrongs; these normative principles mandate that certain lines be
drawn against the advances of science.
299
Opponents of this view often attack the problem of justifying
such a norm. Classical natural law, being rooted in the Judeo-
Christian faith, justifies this norm on the basis that Man is created in
the image of God. In his book, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE, 30 0 Francis
Fukuyama asks, "Is there a secular ground for believing that human
beings are entitled to a special moral status or dignity?
30 1
From a non-religious perspective, Fukuyama argues that there
are secular grounds to believe that human beings are entitled to a
special moral status. His argument goes as follows: rights can
302
emanate from three possible sources, God, Nature, and Man. He
acknowledges the reality that rights from "revealed religion" 30 3 are
296. Genie Out of the Bottle, supra note 269.
297. FUKUYAMA, supra note 47, at 11.
298. This natural law principle has been discussed supra, at Parts III and IV, where I refer
to human beings as an "end in themselves."
299. This natural law principle is discussed supra, at Part IV: IV.THE THIRD
ALTERNATIVE: Natural Law Justification.
300. FUKUYAMA, supra note 47.
301. Id. at 151.
302. Id. at 111-113.
303. Id. at 111.
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not today acknowledged as the basis of liberal political rights. He
further debunks the positivistic approach that rights emanate from
Man.304 This theory holds that rights are whatever the people agree
on, and emphasizes the rule of law to ensure that there are procedures
to ensure that the laws reflect the will of the people. Fukuyama
correctly points out that if there are no universal standards, "who is to
say what the right procedure is?... The answer is that no response is
possible since it has been declared at the outset that there are no
transcendent standards for determining right and wrong beyond
whatever the culture declares to be a right.,
305
Fukuyama, therefore, argues the justification of rights is based
on Nature, human nature specifically. He first distinguishes humans
from animals on the basis of the complexity of human nature, like the
ability to make moral choices, reason and the "broad emotional
gamut" that humans possess.30 6 He argues that this serves as a basis
for universal equality, even though there may be a reasonable
gradation of rights for example, children versus adults, adults with
Alzheimer's versus healthy adults and unformed embryos versus
infants.307
On the issue of therapeutic cloning, Fukuyama remains
ambivalent. He, at least, argues that because an embryo has the
"potential" to become a full human being, it has a moral status in
between that of an infant and other types of cells. 30 8 He suggests that
if humans are to harvest stem cells from embryos, "we should put a
lot of limits and constraints around this activity to make sure that it
does not... push the envelope further."309 The question he posed
though is "will we know when to stop?
3 10
I submit that if embryonic cloning is allowed, the envelope will
be pushed further. As one member of the public observed, "[i]t's
science. If the ability is there, somebody's going to do it." 3'l More
importantly, if one takes the assumption that an embryo is a human
being, not merely one with the "potential" to become one, then there
are even more compelling reasons to ban all cloning, embryonic
304. Id, at 113.
305. Id. at 113.
306. FUKUYAMA, supra note 47, at 143-47.
307. Id at 174-77.
308. Id. at 176.
309. Id. at 177.
310. Id. at 177.
3 !1. The Wellcome Trust, Public Perspectives on Human Cloning,
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/ SciMedOrg/Sources/clonrpt.pdf.
NATURAL LAW IN THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
cloning included.
Ultimately, there are no easy answers. Fukuyama's attempt at
critiquing the biotech revolution is commendably honest. He
recognizes the futility of trying an amoral approach to this whole
issue. For example, in response to Lee Silver's pro-cloning stance,
Fukuyama makes the following observation:
Silver... is horrified at the possibility that [genetic engineering]
could be used to create a class of genetically superior people...
He dismisses the moral concerns of virtually every religion or
traditional moral system with regard to future genetic engineering
but draws the line at what he perceives as threats to human
equality. He does not seem to understand, that given his premises,
there are no possible grounds on which he can object to the
GenRich ... since there is no stable essence common to all human
beings...312
He tries a moral, but non-secular approach to justify giving
rights to embryos on the basis of the consciousness of human nature.
However, while he says that "the problem of how consciousness arose
does not require recourse to the direct intervention of God," he
concedes, "[i]t does not, on the other hand, rule it out either. 313 In
the final analysis, whether you agree with the classical natural law
approach, or with Fukuyma's reasoning, it cannot be denied there are
moral limits which must be taken into account when drawing up
rules.
Any argument, to be meaningful, cannot go on ad infinitum, and
must rest on some reasonable assumptions. In the end, you may find
that the only satisfactory explanation is the classical natural law
approach because unlike all other theories, natural law, in
acknowledging the existence of a transcendent source beyond human
nature, provides an explanation, as far as probabilities can do so take
us using human reasoning, as to why human beings ought to have any
rights at all. Whether one is willing to acknowledge God as that
transcendent source, ultimately, calls for some measure of faith,
although that faith is not necessarily an unreasonable one.
C. Suggested Approach: A Natural Law Response
How, then, should the laws, in particular, the patent laws,
respond to the issue of human cloning? As argued above, a classical
312. FUKUYAMA, supra note 47, at 154.
313. Id. at 216.
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natural law approach would deem cloning to be wrong on the basis of
its commitment to human life and dignity. Because natural law sees
human life beginning at the embryo stage, embryonic cloning for
stem cell research would be equivalent to murder. Likewise, under a
natural law approach, all cloning ought to be banned. Professor Susan
R. Martyn observed that "[l]aw embodies the moral judgments of a
society., 314 "Once people decide which of many, often-competing
moral views they desire, law can provide the tool to create the desired
outcome.
3 15
If we come to the conclusion that something is intrinsically
wrong, it is imperative to use every means possible to close the gap,
including removing the possibility of commercial exploitation
through the patent monopoly, and our laws need to clearly reflect our
moral choices. Because the stakes are so high with human cloning,
the burden should be placed on those who wish to use it to
demonstrate its safety and benefits.316 Until that time, it is more
prudent to "agree with those who stress human fallibility, misplaced
self-confidence and the risks of arrogance. 317
I would argue that if the cloning ban is passed, the best approach
is to amend the patentability provision 318 to specify clearly that
patenting of research related to reproductive and/or embryonic
cloning is prohibited, and not on utility grounds as some have
suggested. It is conceded that cloning is potentially useful to some
extent; the objection to cloning is clearly a moral one, and patent rules
ought not be stretched beyond their ordinary meaning.
Instead, the U.S. patent system could consider an approach along
the lines of that taken by our European counterparts. Article 53(a) of
the European Patent Convention prohibits patents on any invention
that is contrary to public order or morality. 319 In any case, adopting
similar provisions would be consistent with the U.S. obligations under
the TRIPS agreement Article 27.2.320
314. Susan R. Martyn, Human Cloning: The Role of Law, 32 U. TOL. L. R. 375, 375
(2001).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 385.
317. Id. at 386.
318. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
319. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct 5, 1973, art. 53, 13 I.L.M. 271,
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar53 .html.
320. TRIPS, supra note 204, at art. 21.2 (This Article permits certain subject matter to be
deemed unpatentable if they are inventions contrary to ordre public or morality; this explicitly
includes inventions dangerous to human, animal or plant life or health or seriously prejudicial to
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In order for the human cloning ban to be truly effective however,
there must be a certain symmetry among the international laws in
place. If there were no harmonized laws, scientists would simply
move their research to a country where human cloning was legal.
There are already certain efforts being made in that direction.
The European Union has tried to harmonize European laws by
its Directive 98/44,321 in particular Article 5 which prohibits, inter
alia, the cloning of human body parts.3 22 Article 6 considers human
cloning unpatentable, because it would be "contrary to ordre public or
morality. 323 However, Directive 98/44 falls short of the standards
proposed by the Brownback-Landrieu bill because it creates an
exclusion for therapeutic cloning of embryos.324
This divisive issue is not easy to resolve. Historically, we have
often tended to react with retrospective vision, as in the case of
pharmaceutical drugs like thalidomide, so it "may be that the
regulations concerning human cloning will have to await the birth of a
horribly deformed child who is the product of an unsuccessful cloning
attempt.' ,325  Hopefully though, we can call a moratorium to engage
further discussion of the ethical issues of such cloning, so that we can
proceed with informed consent into the biotechnological revolution.
In conclusion, I recognize that the application of natural law
principles will be challenging, because of the complexity of the issues
and the diversity of opinions and beliefs. What I hope to have
achieved though, is to show the reader that natural law principles are
still relevant, and that the traditional ways of justifying the U.S.
patent system may have to be re-examined in the light of natural law
principles.
In the more controversial issues relating to the patent system, I
do not assume to have arrived at the perfect solution. I do assume,
however, that there are objective moral standards which are
the environment. This is subject to the condition that the commercial exploitation of the
invention must also be prevented and that this prevention must be necessary for the protection of
ordre public or morality.).
321. European Community, Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 July 1998, On the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L
213) 13, [hereinafter Directive], http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/
322. Id. art. 5 (providing inter alia, that the "human body, at various stages of its formation
and development ... cannot constitute patentable inventions.").
323. Id.
324. Id. at § 42 (stating inter alia, that "whereas, in any case such exclusion does not
affect inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo
and are useful to it.").
325. FUKUYAMA, supra note 47 at 216.
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discoverable by reason, and through informed debate. Only on this
assumption would this Article, or any debate for that matter, make
any sense at all.
V. CONCLUSION
Endless invention, endless experiment,
Brings knowledge of motion, but not of stillness...
All our knowledge brings us nearer to our ignorance,
All our ignorance brings us nearer to death,
But nearness to death no nearer to GOD
Where is the Life we have lost in living?
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?
- T.S. Eliot, Choruses from the Rock
The starting point of this Article is the observation that patent
law and jurisprudence are inextricably connected. One of the aims of
this Article has been to call for a reprieve to the attitude of
encouraging "endless inventions," in order to consider the issue of
what sort of jurisprudence ought to be adopted in the U.S. patent
system.
In conclusion, a summary of my arguments towards the
development of a natural law jurisprudential approach to the U.S.
patent system is set out as follows:
A. The Limits of an Unitarian Approach
The traditional justification of the U.S. patent system is a
utilitarian argument based on economic grounds. This view argues
that the patent system encourages the disclosure of secrets; disclosure
helps spur further inventions. In turn, inventions lead to industrial
progress. This economic argument has some validity, although there
may be insufficient empirical evidence that proves this beyond a
reasonable doubt. I agree that the U.S. patent system exists, in part,
to promote the progress of technological arts.
Whilst I accept the economic explanation for the U.S. patent
system, I argue against an adoption of utilitarianism as the underlying
philosophy of the U.S. patent system. Utilitarianism is a morality
unto itself, and is one that exalts the common good. A strictly
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utilitarian view rejects the possibility of any other moral standard
other than the common good.
I make the observation that most people, consciously or
unconsciously, espouse moral standards that places a value on the
human individual per se, quite apart from the common good. This
observation is supported by historical accounts of the motivations of
the founding fathers. Indeed, the United States was founded on the
creed that all men were created equal and were endowed with
"inalienable" rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
B. The Limits of a Natural Rights Approach
The competing justification, besides utilitarianism, is the natural
rights justification. This view argues that the inventor ought to be
rewarded for the fruits of his labor. The grant of the patent is the
appropriate reward. The natural rights argument has been rejected as
a justification for the U.S. patent system because in exalting the
inventor's rights, it fails to appropriately address the socio-economic
rationale for the existence of the patent system.
C. The Classical Natural Law Middle Ground
My thesis rejects both utilitarianism and natural rights as a form
of justification for the U.S. patent system. Instead, I propose adopting
classical natural law as a justification of the U.S. patent system.
Natural law has been defined in various ways, but at the lowest
common denominator, it can be defined as a set of universal
prescriptions that are accessible to all who are capable of reason.
I propose the adoption of the classical natural law paradigm as a
way of viewing the U.S. patent system and dealing with some of the
hard issues raised thereby. I define classical natural law to be that
proposed by Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius. These thinkers
predicate their theories on a belief in God and on the assumption that
objective moral standards exist. Classical natural law is also
predicated on the fact that these objective moral standards are
discoverable by reason, and therefore are relevant for our
consideration.
The reader is not required to assume any faith to adopt my
proposal, although if one tries to justify natural law itself, I argue that,
as far as probabilities take us, a belief in God is the most satisfactory
and consistent explanation.
I argue that the natural law paradigm provides the most
satisfactory approach towards justifying the U.S. patent system. As a
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philosophy, natural law acknowledges that the moral obligation to
foster the common good of one's community and hence is superior to
the natural rights theory which downplays the duty of the inventor to
the community. At the same time, it avoids the moral inconsistency
of a strictly utilitarian approach, because it also acknowledges the
intrinsic worth of the human individual.
Classical natural law is also -premised in the weakness of human
nature, in particular, the human inclination towards selfishness. From
this perspective, the patent system's limited patent term is perfectly
justifiable under a natural law approach. Most inventors would not
otherwise freely disclose or allow the free use of their invention to
benefit the common good.
It is important to recognize that the U.S. patent system is more
than a thicket of technical arcane rules. The system's patentability
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, utility and written
description, the notion of a limited patent monopoly and other
inventorship rules are in-built limits that attempt to balance the
common good and the rights of the inventor. These moral choices are
in turned, played out in the political and judicial arena.
Generally, the traditional economic rationale espoused by the
utilitarian is consistent with the natural law approach. However, the
differences between the utilitarianism/natural rights approach on one
hand and the natural law approach on the other show up sharply in the
hard/borderline cases. I argue that one of the greatest challenges that
the U.S. patent system faces may be in the area of biochemistry and
pharmaceutical patents. What the courts and Congress decide today
may well impact our way of life in the future in a significant and
possibly, detrimental manner.
The present development of the U.S. patent system seems to
have one rallying call: "to promote the progress of the arts." The
question remains, at what expense? This Article has suggested that
'progress' should never be at the expense of universal principles
endorsing the sanctity of human life and dignity, nor should principles
of fairness and equity be forgotten in the process of "progress."
The call for the development of a natural law jurisprudence
requires, as a basic premise, the recognition that absolute moral
standards exist. Without this consensus, one view will be as good as
another, and any assertion of right and wrong would be futile.
However, by acknowledging that absolute moral standards exist, there
is hope that present and future debates (including this Article) will
lead to more fruitful resolutions to the hard questions faced by the
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modem society.

